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INTRODUCTION: THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND 
TOBACCO CONTROL ACT 
The United States has required cigarette packages to display 
warning labels since the 1960s.1  The first warning label stated simply, 
“Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health.”2  In 1984, 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act 
requiring tobacco companies to display on every cigarette package 
four periodically-rotating health warnings.3  The Act specified 
language for the four warning labels,4 and required them to “appear 
in conspicuous and legible type in contrast by typography, layout, or 
color with all other printed material on the package.”5  Cigarette 
companies customarily printed the warnings in black and white down 
one side of the package.  As other countries adopted more aggressive 
warning labels to combat smoking, the United States’ regulatory 
structure went unchanged for twenty-five years.6 
On June 22, 2009, President Obama signed the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act7 (“Tobacco Control Act” or 
“Act”) into law.8  It gave the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) the authority to regulate the manufacture and sale of tobacco 
products.  The Tobacco Control Act mandates that every cigarette 
package include one of nine concise phrases highlighting the 
deleterious effects of smoking.9  The term “WARNING” is to be 
printed in all capital letters and seventeen-point font.10  The Tobacco 
Control Act requires the warnings to cover the top half of both the 
front and back of the cigarette package.11  Finally, the Act directed 
the FDA to promulgate “color graphics depicting the negative health 
consequences of smoking to accompany” the textual warnings.12  The 
 
 1. Ranit Mishori, Packing a Heavier Warning: Elsewhere, Cigarette Boxes Bear 
Graphic Evidence of Smoking’s Ill Effects; U.S. Labels Will Soon Do the Same, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-08-
04/news/36819543_1_cigarette-labels-pictorial-warnings-result-in-fetal-injury. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984).  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Mishori, supra note 1. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1333, 4402 (2012) and 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1 (2012)). 
 8. See 21 U.S.C. § 387b (2012). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1). 
 10. See id. § 1333(a)(2). 
 11. See id.   
 12. See id. § 1333(d). 
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FDA was to develop the new graphic warning labels within two 
years.13 
A day before the two-year deadline, on June 21, 2011, the FDA 
unveiled the nine new warning labels,14 and on June 22, 2011, the 
FDA published its Final Rule implementing them.15  The FDA had 
selected the nine graphical labels from a group of thirty-six proposed 
images after comprehensive studies of the effectiveness of each.16  The 
chosen images included photographs and illustrations depicting a 
comparison of a diseased lung to a healthy lung, an autopsied torso, a 
set of teeth and gums ravaged by smoking, a cartoon image of child in 
an incubator, a close-up of a tracheotomy, a woman—perhaps a 
mother?—blowing smoke into a child’s face, a distraught woman, a 
man attached to a respirator, and a man posing in a t-shirt on which is 
printed an anti-smoking slogan.17  One of the statute’s corresponding 
textual warnings respectively accompanies each image.18  Also 
included in the graphic warning is the text “1-800-QUIT-NOW,” the 
phone number for an anti-smoking hotline.19  Under the Tobacco 
Control Act, the new warnings become effective fifteen months after 
the rule’s publication.20  This meant that every new package of 
 
 13. See id.  
 14. See Press Release, FDA, FDA Unveils Final Cigarette Warning Labels (June 
21, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ 
PressAnnouncements/ucm260181.htm.  
 15. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011). 
 16. See FDA, supra note 14. 
 17. See Cigarette Health Warnings, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/ 
Labeling/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/default.htm (last updated Aug. 22, 2012). 
 18. The nine messages are: 
WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive. 
WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children. 
WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease. 
WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer. 
WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease. 
WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby. 
WARNING: Smoking can kill you. 
WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers. 
WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your 
health. 
15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1); FDA, supra note 17. 
 19. See FDA, supra note 17. 
 20. Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009). 
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cigarettes sold after October 22, 2012, was to bear one of the nine new 
graphic warning labels—absent judicial action.21 
On August 16, 2011, shortly after FDA unveiled the new warning 
labels, five tobacco companies, led by R.J. Reynolds, filed suit in the 
District of the District of Columbia.22  On August 19, 2011, in R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, the tobacco companies moved for 
summary judgment and requested a permanent injunction to prevent 
the FDA from enforcing the new warning labels.23  The tobacco 
companies challenged the new warning labels, in part, on First 
Amendment grounds as unconstitutionally compelled speech.24  The 
crux of the tobacco companies’ First Amendment argument was that 
the new cigarette warnings do not satisfy standards articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of 
Ohio,25 in which the Court established a highly lenient standard for 
regulations that compel disclosures in commercial speech.26  The 
tobacco companies argued that, because the standard articulated in 
Zauderer is inapplicable and the government has compelled them, 
private entities, to convey its ideological message, the new warning 
labels should be subjected to, and will fail, strict scrutiny.27 
In the midst of the R.J. Reynolds litigation, the Western District of 
Kentucky and, subsequently, the Sixth Circuit was already 
considering a similar challenge to the underlying statutory provision 
of the Tobacco Control Act creating the graphic warning labels.  The 
Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Discount Tobacco City & Liquor, 
Inc. v. United States on March 19, 2012. 
On February 29, 2012, the District of the District of Columbia 
granted the tobacco companies summary judgment,28 thereby 
reinforcing its earlier decision preliminarily enjoining the graphic 
warning labels.29  In doing so, the D.C. District Court ruled that 
Zauderer did not supply the appropriate standard of analysis for the 
 
 21. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 22. Id. at 39. 
 23. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction, R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 
10. 
 24. See id. at 29–49. 
 25. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 26. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 31–36, 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF 
No. 10. 
 27. Id. at 25–30. 
 28. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 29. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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new graphic warning labels—or, put another way, Zauderer’s narrow 
exception to Supreme Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence had 
not been satisfied.30  The D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments in R.J. 
Reynolds on April 10, 2012, and weighed in with its opinion on 
August 24, 2012. 
Part I of this Note explores the development of the Supreme 
Court’s compelled speech and commercial speech jurisprudence, the 
two threads of jurisprudence informing the lenient standard for 
compelled commercial disclosure developed in Zauderer.31  Next, this 
Note delves into the Court’s reasoning in Zauderer, attempting to 
understand its relationship within the broader context of the Court’s 
compelled speech jurisprudence and its commercial speech 
jurisprudence.32  Part I concludes by analyzing subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions dealing with compelled disclosures to shed light on 
the scope and limits of the Zauderer exception.33 
Part II focuses on the two recent decisions regarding the new 
cigarette warning labels, Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. 
United States34 and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, and situates 
them within the constellation of approaches taken to Zauderer.35 
Part III attempts to provide a coherent unifying approach to 
Zauderer that respects each strand of the Court’s reasoning and—in 
light of that unified approach—evaluates the recent decisions 
regarding the graphic cigarette warning labels.36 
I.  PATHS TO ZAUDERER 
The decision in Zauderer sits at the crossroads of two separate 
lines of First Amendment jurisprudence.  The first is the presumptive 
invalidity of laws forcing private individuals to speak against their 
will.  The second suggests that the First Amendment allows 
encroachments upon commercial speech it would not accept upon 
political, religious, or ideological speech.  One question a court 
interpreting Zauderer must address is how that decision comports 
with these two broader First Amendment principles. 
 
 30. See R.J. Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 272–75. 
 31. See infra notes 37–109 and accompanying text.   
 32. See infra notes 110–32 and accompanying text.    
 33. See infra notes 133–78 and accompanying text. 
 34. 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 35. See infra notes 180–376 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra notes 377–433 and accompanying text. 
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A. Origins of the Prohibition Against Compelled Speech 
The notion that the First Amendment protects an individual’s right 
not to speak just as it protects an individual’s right to speak begins 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette.37  In 1943, the Court in Barnette struck down a 
West Virginia State Board of Education resolution that mandated 
that school children salute the American flag with raised right hand 
and upturned palm.38  Only three years earlier, the Supreme Court 
had upheld a Pennsylvania public school’s authority to mandate that 
its students salute the American flag and recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance.39  In the wake of that earlier decision, the West Virginia 
legislature directed its schools to foster and perpetuate the “ideals, 
principles and spirit of Americanism.”40  In response, the West 
Virginia Board of Education adopted the resolution at issue in 
Barnette.41  A student who failed to conform to the state’s Pledge of 
Allegiance mandate risked expulsion and a criminal truancy charge.42  
A group of Jehovah’s Witnesses, for whom honoring the flag 
amounted to idolatry and conflicted with deeply held religious beliefs, 
challenged the resolution.43 
The Barnette Court overturned its earlier decision in Minersville 
and held that a public school could not compel a student to recite the 
pledge or salute the flag.44  The Court grounded its decision in the 
First Amendment generally, without specifying which of its clauses 
the law violated.45  The case potentially implicated both the Free 
Exercise clause and the Free Speech clause.46  The Court opaquely 
 
 37. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See generally Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The 
Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of 
Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 409 
(Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
 38. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628, 642. 
 39. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 
 40. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625.  
 41. See id. at 626. 
 42. See id. at 629. 
 43. See id.  
 44. See id. at 642. 
 45. See id.  
 46. Scholars have commented on how difficult it is to pin down the precise First 
Amendment foundations for the Court’s reasoning in Barnette; the Court’s language 
is broad, general and, at times, “aphoristic.” See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 37 at 
430–31; Abner Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 
451, 463–64 (1995); Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 
BUFF. L. REV. 847, 852 (2011). 
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stated, “We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the 
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limits on their power 
and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of 
the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control.”47  Elsewhere the Court stated the plaintiff’s challenge 
“[stood] on a right of self-determination in matters that touch 
individual opinion and personal attitude.”48  Regardless of the precise 
constitutional underpinnings, the Court understood the injury as one 
solely inflicted upon the individual compelled to speak and harmful 
because it implicated that speaker’s core values.49  Although Barnette 
initiated a line of jurisprudence that would establish the constitutional 
presumption against laws compelling speech, the Court left the roots 
of the doctrine unclear.  This lack of clarity in turn left the extant 
protection and its limits vague as well. 
Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo was the second case to 
recognize First Amendment protection against compelled speech.  
Like Barnette, Tornillo remained ambiguous about the precise 
constitutional underpinnings for the prohibition against compelled 
speech.50  The case addressed the Miami Herald’s challenge to 
Florida’s right-of-reply statute.51  The Court held that “[c]ompelling 
editors or publishers to publish that which ‘reason tells them should 
not be published’” violated the First Amendment guarantees on 
Freedom of the Press.52  The Court explicitly rejected the idea that 
regulations that merely compelled speech—like the Florida right-of-
reply statute—were relevantly different from outright restrictions.53  
Throughout the decision, the Court wavered, at times basing 
protections against compelled speech in the First Amendment 
 
 47. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 48. Id. at 631. 
 49. Laurent Sacharoff identifies three arguments, all centered around violations 
of what the Court in Barnette calls the speaker’s “freedom of mind,” put forth by the 
Court in Barnette.  That coercion might, first, improperly change the speaker’s 
beliefs; second, create cynicism about core beliefs; and, third, invalidate consent. See 
Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 329, 342–43 (2008). 
 50. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 51. Id. at 245. 
 52. Id. at 256 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 
(1943)).  Previously the Court had upheld a similar FCC rule requiring broadcasters 
to grant third parties airtime without charge to respond to personal criticisms of the 
third party by the station. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 53. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.  
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generally, at others basing them in the Free Press clause specifically.54  
Following Tornillo, the Court had yet to conclusively establish that 
the First Amendment protects individuals against compelled speech 
even when neither religious belief nor freedom of the press is at 
stake. 
It was not until Wooley v. Maynard that the Court isolated the 
Free Speech clause as an independently sufficient source of 
constitutional protection against compelled speech.55  In Wooley, the 
Court faced another challenge by a Jehovah’s Witness to a state 
action that the Witness found “morally, ethically, religiously and 
politically abhorrent,” this time in the inclusion of the New 
Hampshire state slogan “Live Free or Die” on his license plates.56  
Due to his attempts to cover the slogan or snip it off, the plaintiff was 
cited multiple times under state law for obstructing the figures on his 
vehicle’s plates.57  The Court began its analysis by declaring, “freedom 
of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action 
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from 
speaking at all.”58 
Once the Wooley Court declared that the First Amendment 
protected individuals against compelled speech, it proceeded to 
determine whether the state had a “sufficiently compelling” 
countervailing interest to justify compelling speech.59  New 
Hampshire offered two alternative interests in mandating that license 
plates bear  the state motto.60  First, the state argued that because only 
the plates issued to passenger vehicles displayed the motto, police 
officers could more readily determine if a vehicle was properly 
plated.61  Aside from skepticism of the state’s reasoning, the Court 
also criticized the state for using a means disproportionate to the goal, 
stating  “[The state’s] purpose cannot be pursued by means that 
 
 54. Compare id. at 254 (“If it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about a 
confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial 
gloss on that Amendment developed over the years.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 
258 (“It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial 
process can be exercised consistent with the guarantees of a free press as they have 
evolved over time.” (emphasis added)). 
 55. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 56. Id. at 713. 
 57. See id. at 712. 
 58. Id. at 714. 
 59. See id. at 715–16. 
 60. Id. at 716. 
 61. Id.  
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broadly stifle fundamental liberty interests when the end can be more 
narrowly achieved.”62 
The state proffered a second interest to justify compelling the 
vehicle owner’s to bear its message, the communication of a “proper 
appreciation of history, state pride and individualism.”63  This 
rationale, too, was found to be lacking.  Unlike Barnette, in which the 
Court judiciously had rebutted West Virginia’s attempt to instill civic 
ideals by declaring those ideals better served by voluntary 
endorsement,64 the Court in Wooley tersely dispensed of New 
Hampshire’s attempt at civics, stating, “where the State’s interest is to 
disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such 
interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to 
avoid becoming the courier for such message.”65  Thus, Wooley 
suggests that the state’s interest in fostering or advocating an 
ideology—any ideology—can never be “sufficiently compelling” 
enough to justify compelled speech, no matter how closely tailored or 
non-burdensome the law.66 
Nothing in the reasoning in the Barnette or Tornillo decisions 
resembles any degree of systematic means-ends scrutiny.67  In this 
regard, Wooley is the first to engage in such scrutiny.  In Wooley, 
although the Court maintained its presumption that compelled speech 
is unconstitutional, the Court suggested that it would uphold laws 
compelling speech as long as the state provided a “sufficiently 
compelling” interest and employed proportionate and least restrictive 
means to achieve its goal.68 
The Court’s next compelled speech decision, Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, dealt not with legislation compelling speech, but 
with a California State Supreme Court decision compelling access for 
pamphleteers to a privately owned shopping center.69  The owner of 
the shopping center appealed the state court’s decision to the U.S. 
Supreme Court and argued that forcing him to grant the 
 
 62. Id. at 716–17 (“The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the 
light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.” (quoting Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 63. Id. at 717. 
 64. See W. Va. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–41 (1943). 
 65. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717. 
 66. See id.  
 67. See Barnette, 319 U.S. 624; see also Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241, 241 (1974). 
 68. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17. 
 69. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
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pamphleteers access compelled him “to participate in the 
dissemination of an ideological message,” thus infringing on his right 
not to speak.70  The Supreme Court rejected his challenge.  It held 
that compelled access did not infringe the owner’s First Amendment 
rights.71  The Court provided two rationales to distinguish Wooley and 
Barnette.  First, according to the Court, each of those cases involved a 
governmentally proscribed message.72  Second, the Court stated that 
the owner was free to disavow the views of the pamphleteers, 
whereas, presumably in the Court’s view, the Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
Wooley or Barnette could not adequately disassociate themselves 
from the Pledge or New Hampshire’s state motto.73  The Court went 
on to distinguish Tornillo because the right of access sought in that 
case would have impinged on a newspaper’s editorial prerogative.74 
Pruneyard offers an anomalous instance in which the Court upheld 
a government action compelling speech.  The Court’s labored 
attempts to distinguish Pruneyard in later compelled speech 
decisions—by unconvincingly emphasizing that the Pruneyard 
plaintiff had not objected to the content of the speech nor claimed 
that compelled access inhibited his own right to speak—indicate how 
uncomfortably Pruneyard fits with the Court’s compelled speech 
jurisprudence.75 
Still, Pruneyard is consistent with the Court’s other decisions 
insofar as it recognized a unique concern when the government 
compels a private individual to spread the government’s own message 
to the exclusion of other messages.76  What makes the decision in 
Pruneyard an outlier is not that it upheld a law compelling speech, 
but rather that it found decisive constitutional relevance in the fact 
that the compelled message belonged to a third party rather than the 
government.  Like Pruneyard, the decision in Tornillo considered 
 
 70. Id. at 86–87. 
 71. Id. at 88. 
 72. Id.  
 73. See id. at 88. 
 74. Id. at 88. 
 75. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 
580 (1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 12 (1986). 
 76. See, e.g., W. Va. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).  
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whether a state could compel a private individual to convey the 
message of another private individual.77 
The Court’s decision in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission, decided a few months after Zauderer, is more 
consistent than Pruneyard with the Court’s developing compelled 
speech jurisprudence.  As such, the Court’s reasoning in Pacific Gas is 
at odds with its reasoning in Pruneyard.78  In Pacific Gas, the Court 
held that the state of California could not force Pacific Gas & Electric 
Company (PG & E) to include opposing political views in the utility 
company’s billing envelopes.79  In doing so, the Court ignored the 
distinction crucial to its reasoning in Pruneyard.  Pacific Gas suggests 
there is no constitutional difference between a law that compels the 
speaker to foster the government’s view and one that compels the 
individual to foster a private party’s message.80  Both are 
constitutionally suspect.  Moreover, the Court rejected the 
proposition that the right of a corporate speaker not to be compelled 
differs from an individual’s right.81  Pacific Gas solidified the notion 
that the First Amendment protects speakers, whether corporations or 
individuals, from being compelled to spread someone else’s message, 
regardless of whether it is from the government or a third party. 
Apart from ignoring whose message has been compelled, a second 
aspect by which the Court’s reasoning in Pacific Gas is at odds with 
that in Pruneyard is the salience given to a compelled speaker’s 
ability to disavow the compelled message.  In Pruneyard, the Court 
posited the owner’s ability to disavow the pamphleteers’ message as a 
reason to view the pamphleteers’ access as less problematic.82  In 
contrast, in Pacific Gas the Court characterized PG & E’s foreseeable 
disavowal of any opposing views carried in its envelopes as secondary 
compulsion that only compounded the First Amendment injury.83  
The court stated, “The danger that [PG & E] will be required to alter 
its own message as a consequence of the government’s coercive action 
is a proper object of First Amendment solicitude . . . .”84 
 
 77. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974). 
 78. Compare Pruneyard, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), with Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 79. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 20–22. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 8. 
 82. See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 88. 
 83. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16. 
 84. Id. at 16.  
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Once it established that the First Amendment protected PG & E 
from being compelled to speak, the Court proceeded to its analysis.85  
The Court found that the state agency’s ruling was not content 
neutral.86  As such, the Court, as it had in Wooley, scrutinized the 
state agency’s ruling to determine if it was narrowly tailored and 
served a compelling state interest.87  The state proffered two interests, 
both of which the Court found compelling.88  Nonetheless, those 
interests did not suffice.  Rather, according to the Court, the state 
could have advanced its interests through means other than forcing 
PG & E to include opposing political views in its billing envelopes.89  
The Court stated, “Our cases establish that the State cannot advance 
some points of view by burdening the expression of others.”90  In the 
end, the Court held that the state would unconstitutionally infringe 
PG & E’s right not to speak if it required the electric company to 
insert the political message of its opponents in its billing envelopes.91 
Pacific Gas arguably illustrates the Court’s most systematic analysis 
to date of a regulation compelling speech.  It demonstrates the sort of 
analysis—strict scrutiny—that the tobacco companies advocated the 
Court apply to the new warning labels.92  The FDA, in contrast, has 
argued that if Zauderer is inapplicable, courts should apply the level 
of scrutiny given to regulations that restrict commercial speech, a 
 
 85. See id. at 11. 
 86. Id. at 12.  An infringement upon speech is “content neutral” if it affects all 
speech indiscriminately regardless of the message conveyed or speaker conveying the 
message. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791–92 (1989).  Time, place, 
and manner restrictions are the paradigmatic examples of content neutral speech 
restrictions. Id.  Content neutral speech restrictions are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.  Content-based restrictions, restrictions that single out certain messages or 
speakers, are subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny. See id. 
 87. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S at 19. 
 88. The state asserted that requiring PG & E to include the material furthered the 
state’s interest (1) in the effective proceedings to determine utility rates and (2) in 
promoting speech by exposing customers to a variety of perspectives. See id. at 19–
20.  
 89. Id. at 19. 
 90. Id. at 20. 
 91. See id. at 20–21. 
 92. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 29, 
R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 10; see 
also Clay Calvert et al., Playing Politics or Protecting Children? Congressional 
Action & a First Amendment Analysis of the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act, 36 J. LEGIS. 201 (2010) (analyzing the Commonwealth Brands 
litigation  and similarly arguing that the warning labels should be scrutinized strictly 
as traditional compelled speech).  Calvert et al. omit any discussion of Zauderer. See 
id. 
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more lenient standard.93  This Note turns next to a brief background 
of commercial speech jurisprudence before delving into Zauderer. 
B. Commercial Speech Jurisprudence 
The decisions discussed thus far have involved the expression of 
fully protected speech—whether they considered a law compelling 
the expression of fully protected speech from a speaker who would 
rather remain silent or a considered law requiring an individual to 
foster the expression of a third party’s fully protected speech.  First 
Amendment jurisprudence, however, traditionally has not afforded 
commercial speech the full range of safeguards it grants other forms 
of speech.94 
It was not until 1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, that the Court first recognized 
that the First Amendment protected commercial speech.95  The Court 
reasoned that speech should not lose its First Amendment protection 
simply because money was spent to project it.96  The Court based its 
newly articulated protection of commercial speech on the interests of 
society and consumers in the free flow of commercial information.97  
Still, just as the Court extended First Amendment protections to 
commercial speech for the first time, it also cabined those newfound 
protections, recognizing that greater regulation of commercial speech 
is permissible.98  What ultimately developed was a limited measure of 
protection for commercial speech, a protection “commensurate with 
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.”99  It 
could be permissible to subject commercial speech to modes of 
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of 
noncommercial speech.100  While interference with fully protected 
 
 93. See Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at 25, R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C Sept. 9, 2011), ECF No. 18. 
 94. Which level of protection the Supreme Court affords commercial speech is 
currently the topic of debate. See e.g., Calvert et al., supra note 92, at 210–11.  It 
should be sufficient for the purposes of this Note that the Court has been willing to 
make material distinctions based on the commercial nature of the speech involved. 
 95. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 96. Id. at 761.  The Court defined commercial speech as “speech which does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction.” Id. at 762. 
 97. Id. at 763–64. 
 98. See id. at 770. 
 99. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
 100. Id. at 456. 
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speech garnered strict scrutiny, interference with commercial speech 
would garner some lesser degree of scrutiny.101 
The Court articulated that lesser degree of scrutiny in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission.102  In 
Central Hudson, the Court defined commercial speech as an 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.”103  Then the Court articulated a four-step test for 
determining whether a regulation unconstitutionally burdened such 
speech.  First, a court should determine whether the speech was 
deceptive or unlawful.  When speech is neither unlawful nor 
deceptive, the government’s ability to regulate is more 
“circumscribed.”  Thus, the second step requires the government to 
assert a substantial interest served by the regulation.104  Third, if the 
government’s interest is substantial, the proposed regulation must 
directly advance that interest.  Finally, the regulation must be no 
more extensive than necessary to achieve the government’s goal.105 
Although the four-step analysis articulated in Central Hudson 
became the accepted analysis when evaluating restrictions on 
commercial speech, a few Justices have expressed discomfort with or 
hostility to its analysis.106  As with many tests that the Court has 
articulated, its application has not been uniform.107  Furthermore, 
recent decisions have called into question whether the longstanding 
principle that commercial speech receives diminished First 
Amendment protection remains firmly entrenched.108  Nonetheless, 
Zauderer was the product of a period in which the principle that 
 
 101. See e.g, id. at 456–57. 
 102. 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980). 
 103. Id. at 561 (citations omitted). 
 104. Id. at 564. 
 105. Id. at 563–64. 
 106. Justice Thomas has consistently expressed the opinion that there is no 
constitutional basis to afford commercial speech lesser protection, and that Central 
Hudson’s test should be abandoned. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States, 559 U.S. 229, 255 (2010) (Thomas J., concurring); Thompson v. Western 
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (Thomas J., concurring); Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas J., concurring); see also 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia J., concurring). 
 107. See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. 525 (majority and dissent both applying 
Central Hudson to restrictions on tobacco advertising with opposing results). 
 108. Recently, four Justices dissented in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., arguing that 
the majority, by strictly scrutinizing restrictions on the way pharmaceutical 
companies may collect customer information, neglected to recognize the distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial speech. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2673 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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commercial speech did not have the same constitutional pedigree as 
fully protected speech was accepted.  As such, when the Court in 
Zauderer considered the First Amendment implications of compelled 
commercial disclosure, this principle pervaded its reasoning.109 
C. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio110 
In Zauderer, the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence 
intersected with its commercial speech jurisprudence.  The case 
involved an Ohio lawyer’s challenge to the state’s rules regulating the 
content of attorneys’ advertisements.  The lawyer argued that these 
regulations were an infringement of his First Amendment rights.111  
The lawyer challenged three disciplinary rules that the state bar had 
found that the lawyer had violated.  Two of the rules restricted the 
content of lawyers’ advertisements; the other required attorneys who 
advertise contingency rates to disclose whether clients remain liable 
for costs and expenses of unsuccessful claims.112 
The Court straightforwardly applied Central Hudson’s analysis to 
the two challenged restrictions.113  It found that neither restriction—
one a ban on self-recommendation and unsolicited legal advice, the 
other a ban on the use of illustrations in advertising—advanced a 
substantial government interest.  Thus, both failed Central Hudson’s 
third step.114 
Although it had readily used Central Hudson’s analysis to strike 
down two of the state’s disciplinary rules, the Court balked at the 
lawyer’s suggestion that it also apply Central Hudson to the 
disclosure requirement.115  The Court reasoned that disclosure 
requirements are materially different from outright prohibitions on 
speech.116  According to the Court, while restrictions decrease the 
 
 109. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) 
(applying Central Hudson); Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 
(1986) (same); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (same).  As such, some of the 
motivation underlying the leniency toward compelled commercial disclosures 
established in Zauderer may or may not be withdrawn if the Court scraps the 
distinction between commercial speech and fully protected speech. 
 110. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 111. Id. at 636. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 637–49. 
 114. See id. at 641, 647–48. 
 115. See id. at 650. 
 116. Id.  
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flow of information to the public, disclosures are better understood as 
requiring individuals to “provide somewhat more information than 
they might otherwise be inclined to present.”117  The Court 
acknowledged that First Amendment concerns arise any time a 
regulation compels speech.118  The Court quickly distinguished the 
laws at issue in Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo from Ohio’s 
disclosure requirement, however, because the Ohio disciplinary rule 
only regulated commercial speech.119  Unlike the laws at issue in those 
three previous decisions, Ohio had not attempted to prescribe 
national, political, or religious orthodoxy; that is to say, the disclosure 
did not infringe upon fully protected speech.120  Instead, the Court 
stated, “The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the 
form of a requirement that appellant include in his advertising purely 
factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which 
[the lawyer’s] services will be available.”121  When commercial speech 
is at issue, the Court stated, any protection is justified principally by 
the value to consumers of the information that such speech 
provides.122  The commercial speaker’s “constitutionally protected 
interest in not providing any particular factual information” is 
minimal.123  Additionally, the Court stated that the use of disclosure 
requirements, which “trench much more narrowly . . . than do flat 
prohibitions” on the commercial speaker’s interests, further alleviates 
First Amendment concerns.124 
Having dispensed with the traditional First Amendment concerns 
raised by laws that compel speech, the Court laid out a new test for 
commercial disclosure requirements, a test less rigorous than either 
Central Hudson or strict scrutiny.125  The Zauderer Court held “that 
an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in 
preventing deception of consumers.”126  Apart from asking only that 
laws reasonably relate to the state interest, the Court in this new test 
 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 651. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 651–54. 
 126. Id. at 651. 
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also refrained from engaging in a “strict ‘least restrictive’ means 
analysis,” like the one prescribed by Central Hudson’s final step.127  
The Court held that Ohio’s rule requiring attorneys to disclose 
whether their advertised contingency rates include costs and expenses 
easily met these new standards because the potential for deception 
from advertisements lacking such a disclosure was self-evident.128 
One can interpret Zauderer’s analysis as an alternative for 
commercial speech that is inherently or potentially deceptive but not 
unlawful or blatantly deceptive.  Because such speech would fail (or 
would come close enough to failing) the first step of the Central 
Hudson analysis,129 the government is justified in imposing more 
burdens on the speaker to offset the potential deception.130 
A competing interpretation of the Court’s justification of the more 
lenient analysis set forth in Zauderer is based on the minimal 
protection afforded to commercial speakers.  In contrast to laws 
compelling fully protected speech, which are constitutionally 
problematic primarily because of the affront to the individual forced 
to spread an unwanted message, Zauderer might suggest that a 
commercial speaker’s First Amendment interest in being free of 
intrusions is relatively inconsequential and thus easily overridden.131  
Therefore, the concerns that justify strict scrutiny when the 
government compels fully protected speech are absent when the 
government compels commercial speech.  A lower standard of 
scrutiny for such regulations is appropriate. 
Although these views are not mutually exclusive, neither view gives 
rise to the other.  The two divergent interpretations are rooted in 
distinct strands of reasoning that inform the Court’s decision in 
Zauderer: first, that disclosure of “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” information benefits consumers’ interests while only 
minimally infringing on the commercial speaker’s interest; second, 
that government should be granted broader discretion when it is 
 
 127. Id. at 651 n.14.  
 128. Id. at 652. 
 129. Recall that the first step in Central Hudson’s analysis asks whether the speech 
is deceptive or unlawful. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).  
 130. The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wenger suggests this 
interpretation. 427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005).   
 131. See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, It’s What’s for Lunch: Nectarines, 
Mushrooms, and Beef—The First Amendment and Compelled Commercial Speech, 
41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359, 367–76 (2007) (arguing that Zauderer has created the 
assumption that commercial speech is valued by the accuracy of information, not the 
autonomy of commercial speakers). 
STRAUB_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:39 PM 
1218 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
trying to prevent consumer deception particularly.  Either of these 
strands might independently motivate the more lenient standard set 
forth in Zauderer.132  Parsing each of these distinctive textual origins 
helps to recognize how different courts have come to broader or 
narrower understandings about how to analyze compelled 
commercial disclosures. 
D. The Supreme Court and Disclosure Requirements Following 
Zauderer 
In the years since Zauderer, the Supreme Court has decided a 
number of cases involving disclosure requirements.  These cases help 
define the limits of Zauderer, but like Zauderer itself they leave many 
questions unsatisfactorily answered.  Furthermore, some Justices’ 
statements indicate that fundamental presumptions of Zauderer are 
not beyond reconsideration. 
The first decision to consider a disclosure requirement post-
Zauderer occurred in 1986 with Meese v. Keene.133  In Meese, the 
Court rejected a challenge to a federal statute imposing disclosures on 
films designated “political propaganda.”134  The statute required that 
all films so designated carry a disclosure informing the recipient that 
the film was registered with the Department of Justice and identifying 
the distributor and the distributor’s principal.135  Although the 
appellee, a California state senator who wished to exhibit Canadian 
films about acid rain and nuclear war, primarily challenged the films’ 
“propaganda” designation,136 the Court cited the disclosure 
requirement as a reason to uphold the statute.137  The Court found 
that the disclosure requirement was a laudable alternative to 
“prohibit[ing], edit[ing] or restrain[ing] the distribution of advocacy 
materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from conversion, 
confusion, or deceit.”138  Echoing Zauderer’s reasoning, the Court 
stated, “By compelling some disclosure of information and permitting 
 
 132. Logically, this also entails a third interpretation: that Zauderer established 
two tests, one for regulations aimed to curb consumer deception and another for 
disclosures of purely factual, uncontroversial information.  Either of these two would 
be sufficient to receive an exception to the Court’s presumption that compelled 
speech is unconstitutional. 
 133. 481 U.S. 465 (1987). 
 134. Id. at 485. 
 135. Id. at 470–71. 
 136. Id. at 467–68. 
 137. Id. at 480–81. 
 138. Id. at 480.   
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more, the Act’s approach recognizes that the best remedy for 
misleading or inaccurate speech contained within materials subject to 
the Act is fair, truthful, and accurate speech.”139 
The Court’s reasoning in Meese paralleled its reasoning in 
Zauderer.  In both decisions, the Court found that disclosure 
furthered the consumer or audience’s interest in access to more 
information while minimally infringing on the speaker’s interest in 
conveying her message.140  In both decisions, the Court accepted as 
legitimate the government’s interest in preventing deception—or at 
least potential deception.141  Nonetheless, the decision in Meese did 
not invoke Zauderer; it did not even mention Zauderer.142 
It is unclear how one should understand Meese’s failure to rely on 
Zauderer.  Unlike the commercial disclosure in Zauderer, the 
disclosures in Meese were aimed at films designated as propaganda 
and, thus, affected core political speech.  In Meese, the state interest 
was as much to prevent “conversion”143 as it was to prevent 
deception.144  What, then, is the appropriate level of scrutiny in such 
cases?  Because the appellee challenged only the “propaganda” 
designation, not the disclosure requirement, the Court did not 
address what level of scrutiny applies to disclosures that implicate 
fully protected speech.  Nonetheless, Meese suggests that, even when 
fully protected speech is at stake, the Court is categorically more 
tolerant of disclosures than restrictions.145 
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 
Inc., the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a North Carolina 
statute governing the solicitation of charitable contributions by 
professional fundraisers.146  One of the challenged provisions required 
 
 139. Id. at 481. 
 140. See supra notes 128–35 and accompanying text. 
 141. Meese begins to illustrate, however, how nebulous the notion of “aimed at 
preventing deception” turns out to be. See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying 
text. 
 142. See id. 
 143. “Conversion,” the Court’s term, although it does not necessarily denote a 
listener risks being persuaded to a false belief, seems to connote that fundamental 
beliefs are at stake and should these beliefs be expressed, it would constitute fully 
protected speech. See supra note 138. 
 144. This language is reminiscent of regulations aimed at fostering national, 
political, and religious orthodoxy which the Court has consistently struck down if 
they restrict speech, like the law at issue in Wooley or Barnette. See supra note 65–74 
and accompanying text. 
 145. If this is so, that also suggests that disclosures are a very specific and relatively 
innocuous form of compelled speech. 
 146. 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988). 
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professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors what 
percentage of contributions the represented charities actually 
received.147  In contrast to the leniency that the Court afforded to 
compelled disclosure in Meese, the Riley Court assessed the 
disclosure requirement as stringently as it would restrictions placed 
on fundraisers.  The determinative inquiry, according to the Riley 
majority, was not whether the statute required a factual disclosure, 
but rather the nature of the speech at issue and the burden placed on 
the compelled speaker.148  Compelled disclosures in the context of 
fully protected, non-commercial speech would be analyzed as 
rigorously as the regulations in Wooley or Tornillo.149 
The Riley Court acknowledged that the facts of the case required it 
to address how to classify speech when the speech’s commercial 
aspects are “inextricably intertwined” with what would otherwise be 
classified as fully protected speech.150  In such cases, the majority 
stated, the courts are not to parse speech into its separate components 
to assess each by a different standard.151  Instead, if a law affects core 
protected speech, like when a law mandates that political fundraisers 
disclose their gross percentages, courts should apply the standard 
appropriate for fully protected speech—that is, in such cases, the 
courts should apply strict scrutiny.152 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, argued in 
dissent that the statute was comparable to disclosures required in 
securities transactions and merely required the disclosure of “relevant 
and verifiable facts.”153  Rehnquist reasoned that the fundraising 
disclosures were minimally burdensome and thus did not justify the 
application of strict scrutiny.154  The Chief Justice believed that the 
state’s interest in “better inform[ing] the donating public as to where 
its money will go” was sufficiently strong.155  In many ways, the Chief 
 
 147. Id. at 795. 
 148. Id. at 796 (“Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a 
compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect 
of the compelled statement thereon.”). 
 149. See id. 797–98 (“[Wooley and Tornillo] cannot be distinguished simply 
because they involved compelled statements of opinion while here we deal with 
compelled states of ‘fact’: either form of compulsion burdens protected speech.”). 
 150. Id. at 796. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id.  
 153. Id. at 811. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. at 810 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 17, Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind 
of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (No. 87-328)). The majority also sympathized with 
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Justice’s dissent was consistent with the reasoning found in both 
Zauderer and Meese.  Like Zauderer and Reese, Rehnquist’s dissent 
argued that factual disclosures constitute minimal infringements upon 
a speaker’s First Amendment rights, and a sufficient state interest 
easily outweighs these minimal infringements. 
Rehnquist’s dissent did not invoke Zauderer for support.  By 
contrast, the majority rebutted the Chief Justice’s dissent by 
specifically distinguishing the context at issue from the commercial 
speech addressed in Zauderer.156  Riley set a clear wedge between the 
tolerance the Court would grant compelled commercial disclosure 
requirements and the lack of tolerance it would grant compelled 
disclosure requirements implicating fully protected speech.  “Purely 
commercial speech,” the majority asserted, “is more susceptible to 
compelled disclosure requirements.”157  Simply limiting a disclosure to 
factual information, the Court stated, does not obviate its substantial 
burden on protected speech.158 
This conclusion answered the question that remained after Meese 
as to which level of scrutiny should apply to disclosures that implicate 
fully protected speech.  It also created tension with that decision’s 
loose and seemingly deferential analysis.159  The decision in Riley 
starkly delineates one limit on Zauderer’s exception to compelled 
speech jurisprudence.  Zauderer applies to purely commercial 
compelled disclosure requirements.  Riley also potentially calls into 
question reasoning in Zauderer that found factual disclosure to be 
minimally invasive, least restrictive means. 
Like Zauderer, Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business & 
Professional Regulation dealt with a mixture of restrictions and 
disclosure requirements imposed by a state bar on lawyers’ ads.160  
Unlike Zauderer, however, in Ibanez the Court failed to 
systematically separate its analysis of the restrictions from its analysis 
of the disclosure requirements.  The disclosure at issue required 
attorneys who cite a “specialist” accreditation in their advertisements 
to disavow any state agency of that accreditation and disclose the 
 
the state’s intention despite finding the disclosures unnecessary. See id. at 798 
(“Although we do not wish to denigrate the State’s interest in full disclosure, the 
danger the State posits is not as great as might initially appear.”). 
 156. See id. at 796 n.9. 
 157. Id.  
 158. See id. at 797–98. 
 159. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
 160. 512 U.S. 136 (1994). 
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relevant accrediting standards.161  The Court invalidated the rule 
because the state failed to prove that the regulation addressed some 
actual deception or confusion.162  Moreover, the Court hinted that the 
disclosure requirement might have been unduly burdensome.163  
Given the brevity of the Court’s analysis and the relative inattention 
to Zauderer, Ibanez suggests only that when commercial speech is not 
self-evidently deceptive or confusing, the government bears the 
burden of establishing that the compelled disclosure rectifies some 
non-hypothetical harm.164 
The Supreme Court provided its most recent and, arguably, most 
instructive analysis of a commercial disclosure requirement post-
Zauderer in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States.165  In 
Milavetz, a law firm challenged the application of Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 to attorneys.166  
Among its complaints, the firm argued that provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Act that required legal advertisements for 
bankruptcy assistance to disclose information about the Act were 
unconstitutional.167  The Milavetz Court rejected the firm’s contention 
that Central Hudson should govern the Court’s analysis and, instead, 
applied Zauderer.168  The Court gave two reasons for this.  First, the 
Court pointed out that the provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse Act in 
question “is directed at misleading commercial speech.”169  Second, 
the provision “impose[s] a disclosure requirement rather than an 
affirmative limitation on speech.”170 
The Court then offered a synopsis of Zauderer.  The Court 
reiterated, first, that the primary justification for First Amendment 
protections for commercial speech lies in its value to consumers while 
the commercial speaker’s interests are minimal; second, that 
unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements would 
 
 161. Id. at 146.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at 146–47. 
 164. But see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 
471 U.S. 626, 652–53 (1985) (“When the possibility of deception is as self-evident . . . 
we need not require the State to ‘conduct a survey of the . . . public before it [may] 
determine that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.’” (quoting FTC v. 
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391–92 (1965))). 
 165. 559 U.S. 229 (2010). 
 166. Id. at 234. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 249. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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violate the First Amendment; and third, that commercial disclosure 
requirements need only be reasonably related to a state’s interest in 
preventing deception.171  Two important observations can be made 
about the Court’s reconstruction of Zauderer.  First, the Court seems 
to have implied that any disclosure requirement that otherwise 
conforms to the exception articulated in Zauderer is not “unjustified 
or unduly burdensome.”172  The logic of Milavetz seems to suggest 
that any disclosure requirement that is reasonably related to the 
government’s interest in preventing consumer deception is, by that 
very fact, never unduly burdensome.173  Second, Milavetz, like 
Zauderer before it, confined itself to disclosures aimed at rectifying 
potentially misleading advertising.  Nonetheless, the Court removed 
the state’s burden of proving that the commercial speech has a 
tendency to mislead when the possibility of deception is self-
evident.174  Still, whether the Court would allow state interests other 
than preventing consumer deception to garner Zauderer’s lenient 
scrutiny remained an unanswered question. 
In Milavetz, Justice Thomas concurred to express his willingness to 
“reexamine Zauderer and its progeny in an appropriate case to 
determine whether these precedents provide sufficient First 
Amendment protection against government-mandated disclosures.”175  
Thomas asserted his belief that the First Amendment did not support 
lowered scrutiny for any regulation of commercial speech, compelled 
disclosures or restrictions alike.176  Further, he noted that the 
distinction between compelling speech and restricting speech had no 
constitutional significance when it came to protected speech.177  
Although Thomas ultimately concurred in judgment, his concurrence 
 
 171. Id. at 249–50. 
 172. See id. (“Unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements offend 
the First Amendment by chilling protected speech, but ‘an advertiser’s rights are 
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the 
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.’” (quoting Zauderer v. Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))). 
 173. This construction is not unique to Milavetz.  In fact, it is also present in 
Zauderer, but the Court in Zauderer also suggested it is not willing to do a “strict” 
least restrictive means analysis, leaving open the possibility that some “less than 
strict” least restrictive means analysis might at times be appropriate even under 
Zauderer. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 & n.14. 
 174. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 251. 
 175. Id. at 256 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 176. Id. at 255. 
 177. Id. at 255 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed. Of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 
796–97 (1988)). 
STRAUB_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:39 PM 
1224 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
nevertheless signaled pressure to further contract or eliminate 
Zauderer.178 
The decisions in Meese, Riley, Ibanez, and Milavetz clarified the 
application of Zauderer’s exception to compelled speech doctrine, 
but major uncertainties persist.  Meese and Riley suggested that 
Zauderer is limited to commercial speech; Riley limited it to purely 
commercial speech.  Furthermore, the absence of any cases applying 
Zauderer when the state’s purpose was not to prevent consumer 
deception suggests—although inconclusively—that the Supreme 
Court confines Zauderer to compelled disclosure requirements that 
address potentially deceptive commercial speech. 
II.  TOBACCO WARNINGS AND THE ISSUE OF INTERPRETING 
ZAUDERER 
A. Conservative or Liberal Zauderer179 
Many uncertainties persist about how to apply the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Zauderer.  The primary question that the courts 
have grappled with is whether Zauderer’s exception should be limited 
to disclosures preventing consumer deception.  Commercial 
disclosures have become ubiquitous.  Scholars emphasize the extent 
to which Congress, executive agencies, state legislatures, and 
municipalities rely on disclosure requirements to achieve a wide 
range of objectives.180  In many cases their goal is not strictly to 
prevent consumer deception.  Disclosures are used also to increase 
consumers’ access to information to aid in their decision-making, 
even when there is no potential for deception.181  In some instances, 
 
 178. Justice Thomas dissented in Citizens United v. FEC, arguing that the 
disclosure at issue should be invalidated and that limiting individuals to an “as 
applied” challenge insufficiently vindicated speech rights. 558 U.S. 310, 480 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Underlying Justice Thomas’s 
position was the belief that disclaimers and disclosures, like restrictions, have a 
chilling effect and impose unconstitutional limitations on a speaker’s rights. See id.    
 179. See infra notes 129–32 and accompanying text. 
 180. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the 
Constitutionality of Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 855, 859 (2010); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled 
Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, 
Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 562–63 (2006). 
 181. In the context of securities disclosure requirements Post calls this the goal of 
“promot[ing] transparent and efficient markets,” but generally it refers to disclosures 
of any sort that aim to provide consumers with accurate information to allow 
consumers to assess a product or service’s true value. See Post, supra note 180, at 
562–63.  
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the goal is a paternalistic attempt to change consumer behavior to 
effectuate some further state interest like public health or safety.182  
This raises the question of whether compelled commercial disclosures 
like nutrition labels should be subjected to Zauderer’s lenient 
scrutiny even though consumers likely are not deceived, for instance, 
that a bag of chocolate chip cookies has more sugar, calories, 
carbohydrates, and less Vitamin A than a bag of baby carrots.183 
While much of the disagreement between courts about the limits of 
Zauderer centers on the question of which government interests can 
justify compelled commercial disclosures, this is not the only open 
question.  A second question concerns how to understand the phrase 
“purely factual and uncontroversial” and incorporate it into 
Zauderer’s analysis.184  These two interpretative questions are 
independent.  While disclosing purely factual information can achieve 
paternalistic goals, these goals also might be achieved more 
effectively by compelling disclosure of information that is not strictly 
factual or uncontroversial.  How far a court is willing to extend the 
category of what constitutes a purely factual disclosure need not 
depend on whether the court limits Zauderer’s analysis to disclosures 
aimed at preventing consumer deception. 
A third question, not entirely clarified in either Zauderer or 
Milavetz, is how courts should assess relative burdens that the 
disclosure requirement imposes.  Not only do both decisions suggest 
 
 182. Gielow Jacobs discusses what she labels “paternalistic” state interests in which 
the government regulates speech to effect changes in commercial transactions to 
achieve some public good. See Gielow Jacobs, supra note 180, at 879–80.  Cigarette 
warning labels seem to provide a classic example of this sort of regulation. Id. at 880. 
But see Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 23, R.J. 
Reynolds v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2011), ECF No. 18 (arguing 
that the primary goal of the new cigarette warnings qualifies as preventing confusion 
or deception). 
 183. Circuits have taken opposing positions on this issue.  The First Circuit, for 
instance, explicitly rejected the view that Zauderer’s analysis should be limited to 
disclosure aimed at preventing deception. See Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 
429 F.3d 294, 310, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005).  The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, has stated 
it would confine the application of Zauderer’s analysis to disclosure requirements 
aimed at preventing deception. See Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 233 F.3d 
981, 995 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 184. Compare Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (finding Zauderer inapplicable because the disclosed material constituted a 
subjective, highly controversial opinion), with Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966–67 (2009), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (finding a disclosure requirement 
unconstitutional under Zauderer’s analysis because the disclosure failed to convey 
factual information).   
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that disclosure requirements are categorically less restrictive than 
other forms of regulation,185 language in both decisions also suggests 
that when a disclosure requirement is reasonably related to 
preventing consumer deception, courts need not inquire if it is unduly 
burdensome.186  Still, some courts have read Zauderer to prescribe an 
assessment of burdens imposed by disclosure requirements.187 
These three questions—the role of burdens imposed by disclosures, 
which state interests justify disclosure, and what “purely factual” 
means—are internal interpretative questions.188  Courts seeking to 
apply Zauderer also face external interpretative questions, 
specifically the question of how to situate the Zauderer decision into 
broader First Amendment jurisprudence.  Conceptually speaking, this 
question requires a court to determine if Zauderer is an exception to 
the Supreme Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence, an offshoot of 
its commercial speech jurisprudence, or if it resides at a crossroads 
between the two doctrines.189  Practically speaking, how a court 
addresses that question will determine which test the court should 
apply if it finds Zauderer inapplicable.  A court might view Zauderer 
as providing a limited exception to strictness with which it would 
otherwise assess laws attempting to compel speech, or a court might 
view Zauderer as a further loosening of the already relaxed scrutiny it 
applies to regulations of commercial speech.190 
Because Zauderer leaves many independent, open questions it may 
not be useful to categorize the various interpretations along a linear 
spectrum of broad to narrow depending on how any one question is 
 
 185. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 650 (1985). 
 186. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
 187. See e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 188. By “internal interpretive questions,” this Note refers to questions regarding 
the proper application of the analysis articulated in Zauderer. 
 189. Compare Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 652 (aligning Zauderer’s analysis with 
compelled speech jurisprudence), with United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 849 
(10th Cir. 2005) (describing Zauderer’s analysis as a modification of Central 
Hudson’s analysis). 
 190. This difference is not purely academic.  The arguments that the parties made 
in R.J. Reynolds illustrate what is at stake.  In its brief, the FDA urged the district 
court to apply Central Hudson if it found Zauderer inapplicable. See Defendant’s 
Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 15, R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, No. 
11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2011), ECF No. 18.  On the other hand, the tobacco 
companies urged the district court to find Zauderer inapplicable and, subsequently, 
apply strict scrutiny. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent 
Injunction at 29, R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011), 
ECF No. 10. 
STRAUB_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:39 PM 
2013] FAIR WARNING? 1227 
answered.191  Instead, by considering the effect that implementing a 
particular interpretation will have on the “vast regulatory apparatus 
. . . erected on the foundation of Zauderer,”192 different approaches 
can be categorized as more liberal and more conservative.193  A liberal 
interpretation allowing government greater license under the First 
Amendment to compel commercial disclosures would not undermine 
this vast regulatory regime.  A more conservative interpretation using 
the First Amendment to more narrowly circumscribe the range of 
permissible compelled commercial disclosures would scale back the 
vast regime.  The new graphic cigarette warning labels perfectly 
illustrate the alternative approaches.  The more conservatively a court 
confines the scope of Zauderer’s exception, the more likely it is that 
the court will strike down the FDA’s new graphic warning labels as 
unconstitutional compelled speech.  The more liberally a court 
interprets Zauderer, the more likely the warnings will stand. 
B. Litigation Over the Tobacco Control Act’s Cigarette 
Warning Labels 
1. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States 
On August 31, 2009, shortly after the enactment of the Tobacco 
Control Act, five tobacco companies and a tobacco retailer filed suit 
in the Western District of Kentucky.194  In the resulting litigation, 
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, the companies 
challenged each provision of the Act that implicated the First 
Amendment.195  The court ultimately enjoined enforcement of two 
provisions: a ban on color graphics in tobacco advertisements and a 
ban on claims implying tobacco products are safer as a result of FDA 
regulation.196  The district court concluded that every other provision 
 
 191. Jacobs employs the “narrow” and “broad” terminology and focuses primarily 
on the which state purposes are acceptable under Zauderer. See Gielow Jacobs, 
supra note 180, at 863. 
 192. Post, supra note 180, at 562 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, 
Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 
123, 156 (1996)).  For an example of a regulation qualifying as part of this vast 
regulatory apparatus, see the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act codified at 21 
C.F.R. § 101.1, which provides the guidelines for nutritional warning labels on food. 
 193. These terms are used without referring to political or ideological 
connotations. 
 194. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 
2010). 
 195. Id. at 519. 
 196. Id. at 541. 
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withstood the tobacco companies’ challenge, including the provision 
requiring the cigarette packs to display the new graphic warning 
labels.197 
The district court’s discussion of the graphic cigarette warning 
labels is notable for two reasons.  First, it failed to distinguish 
between restrictions on speech and compulsions of speech.198  The 
Commonwealth Brands court applied Central Hudson’s four-step 
analysis to the provisions of the Act restricting tobacco advertising as 
well as to the inchoate cigarette label warnings.199  Second, the FDA 
had not promulgated the final version of the graphics by the time the 
case was decided.  The court stated, nonetheless, that it did not 
believe “the addition of a graphic image [would] alter the substance 
of [the government’s] message[], at least as a general rule.”200 
Both the tobacco companies and the United States appealed the 
Western District of Kentucky’s decision, and on March 19, 2012, the 
Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in the case, recaptioned as Discount 
Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States.201  With the exception 
of the graphic warning labels, the panel agreed on the 
constitutionality of each challenged provision of the Tobacco Control 
Act.202  Judge Eric L. Clay, who authored the otherwise unanimous 
opinion, split with his fellow judges on the graphic warning labels’ 
constitutionality.  He dissented, arguing that the graphic aspects of 
the warning labels violated the First Amendment.203  The other 
judges, Judge Jane B. Stranch joined by Judge Michael R. Barrett, 
upheld the constitutionality of the graphic warning label provision of 
the Tobacco Control Act.204 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. at 528–32.  
 199. See id. at 532 (“[T]he Court finds that the warning requirement is sufficiently 
tailored to advance the government’s substantial interest under Central Hudson.”). 
 200. Id. 
 201. 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 202. See id. at 524–31.  In all, the unanimous majority affirmed the district court 
rulings that upheld the Act’s restrictions on the marketing of modified-risk tobacco 
products, the ban on tobacco company event sponsorship, and the ban on tobacco 
branding on non-tobacco merchandise, the ban on free sampling.  Next, the 
unanimous majority affirmed the district court’s determination that restricting 
tobacco companies to black and white advertising violated the First Amendment.  
Finally, the unanimous majority reversed the court below and upheld the provision of 
the Tobacco Control Act restricting tobacco companies’ ability to imply that FDA 
regulation renders tobacco products safer. See id. at 518.    
 203. See id at 524–31; see also supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text. 
 204. See id. at 551–69. 
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At the outset, the majority emphasized that it would construe the 
tobacco companies’ challenge facially, rather than as-applied.205  This 
meant the court would consider the constitutionality of the provision 
generally; it would not analyze the nine images published in the 
FDA’s June 2011 Final Rule.206  For the tobacco companies’ facial 
challenge to succeed, they would have to convince the court that the 
underlying provision of the Tobacco Control Act offended the First 
Amendment regardless of which images the FDA ultimately 
published.207  The Discount Tobacco City court cited four reasons for 
restraining itself to a facial assessment of the act’s warning label 
provision.  First, the court refused to assess any specific image 
because the FDA published the Final Rule only one month prior to 
oral arguments and the selected warnings would not appear until well 
after arguments.208  Second, there could be no appellate review of any 
specific images because, according to the majority, the district court 
had not ruled on any specific images.209  Third, the majority 
emphasized that the tobacco companies’ own litigation strategy 
sought to independently challenge the finalized warning labels in a 
separate suit, namely R.J. Reynolds v. FDA.210  Finally, granting the 
relief that the tobacco companies requested—striking down the 
warning labels for all tobacco producers and sellers, not merely the 
parties before the court—required the court to issue a facial ruling on 
the challenged legislation.211  According to the majority, “Addressing 
the specific images would require us to reach a constitutional question 
that was neither briefed nor argued and turns on facts not available, 
litigated, or considered by the district court, all of which would fly in 
the face of the restraint we should exercise during judicial review.”212 
 
 205. See id. at 552.  
 206. See id. 
 207. See id. at 554 (“To succeed in a typical facial attack, [a plaintiff] would have to 
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [the statute] would be valid, 
or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.” (quoting United States v. 
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1557, 1587 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 208. See id. at 552–53.  The Sixth Circuit heard oral arguments on July 27, 2011.  
The FDA published its Final Rule on June 22, 2011. Id.  The Final Rule was set to 
take effect on September 22, 2011. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 209. See id. at 553 (parsing the district court’s language to determine that the court 
below had considered the provision generally). 
 210. See id. at 553–54 (noting that tobacco companies’ complaint in R.J. Reynolds 
characterized the Discount Tobacco City litigation as a facial challenge, and asserting 
that “[l]itigation strategy is unquestionably the domain of Plaintiffs”).  
 211. See id. at 554 (citing John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010)). 
 212. Id. at 553. 
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The Discount Tobacco City court next considered the appropriate 
level of scrutiny for analyzing compelled commercial disclosures.213  
The majority suggested two options.  First, if a commercial disclosure 
requirement meets the conditions outlined in Zauderer, it garners a 
lenient rational basis review.214  Alternatively, if a disclosure 
requirement fails to satisfy the conditions in Zauderer, courts should 
treat it like any other law compelling speech and apply strict 
scrutiny.215  The Discount Tobacco City majority, therefore, sided 
with the Seventh Circuit and posited that within the wider realm of 
First Amendment jurisprudence, Zauderer’s analysis provides an 
exception to the stringent scrutiny typically applied to laws that 
compel speech.216 
Two cases, the Supreme Court’s decision in Milavetz217 and the 
Second Circuit’s decision in National Electrical Manufacturers 
Association v. Sorrell,218 highlighted for the majority just how 
leniently disclosure requirements should be assessed when a 
disclosure requirement meets Zauderer’s triggering conditions.219  
These cases emphasized three important considerations.  First, they 
demonstrated that the government does not need to prove that the 
disclosure will fulfill its intended aim effectively in all or even most 
circumstances.220  Rather, the government must only prove as a matter 
of common sense that the disclosure will advance the state’s 
purported interest and any effect toward that end, however slight, will 
suffice.221  Moreover, no more proof of the disclosure’s effectiveness is 
 
 213. See id. at 554. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. (citing Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651–52 (7th 
Cir. 2006)).  
 216. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 218. 272 F.3d 104, 113–16 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Zauderer to disclosure 
requirements for products containing mercury). 
 219. See, e.g., Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 556–57 (“The Second Circuit 
case of [Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n] reinforces the principles . . . that deciding whether 
the required disclosure satisfies the reasonably related requirement is all that is 
necessary to determine the disclosure’s constitutionality, and . . . that satisfying this 
requirement is a simple task.”). 
 220. See id. at 557–58; see also id. at 564 (noting with approval that the Nat’l Elec. 
Mfrs. Ass’n court found that a common sense determination that commerce might 
change their behavior sufficiently satisfied Zauderer’s scrutiny). 
 221. See id. at 557 (“[The] constitutionality [of a disclosure requirement] does not 
hinge upon some quantum of proof that a disclosure will realize the underlying 
purpose.  A common sense analysis will do.  And the disclosure has to advance the 
purpose only slightly.” (citing Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 115)).    
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necessary.222  When the aim is to prevent consumer deception, 
disclosures need only provide information that some consumers find 
pertinent when deciding whether to purchase goods or procure 
services.223  Extrapolating from the reasoning in these earlier 
decisions, the Discount Tobacco City majority posited a very liberal 
interpretation of the “reasonably related” component of Zauderer’s 
analysis, one highly deferential to a government’s intended purpose. 
Second, for Discount Tobacco City all factual disclosures fall 
within the ambit of Zauderer’s analysis.224  National Electrical 
Manufacturers Association particularly reinforced for the Discount 
Tobacco City majority that the critical factor in deciding whether to 
apply Zauderer’s rational basis review is whether the disclosure 
requirement compels factual information or opinion.225  Thus, 
Zauderer’s “purely factual and uncontroversial” component functions 
as a triggering condition for its rational basis review.  Moreover, the 
Discount Tobacco City court consciously simplified “purely factual 
and uncontroversial” to a question of whether the disclosure reveals 
factual information.226  As long as the disclosed information is factual, 
the disclosure requirement garners the Zauderer’s lenient rational 
basis review.  If the condition is not satisfied, Zauderer requires that 
 
 222. See id. 
 223. See id. at 556 (noting that the Milavetz Court found disclosures constitutional 
because they revealed facts pertinent to consumer decision-making); see also id. at 
564 (“In concluding that it was probable that some consumers would change their 
behavior in response to disclosures, [National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n] did not point to any 
evidence showing that some consumers would change; instead, it reasonably assumed 
they would based on common sense.  That sufficed.” (citations omitted)).  
 224. See id. at 555 (“Zauderer relied on the distinction between a fact and a 
personal or political opinion to distinguish factual, commercial-speech disclosure 
requirements, to which courts apply a rational-basis rule, from the type of compelled 
speech on matters of opinion that is ‘as violative of the First Amendment as 
prohibitions on speech.’” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650)).  
 225. See id. at 556 (“[Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n] reinforces the principle[] that 
distinguishing between a fact and a personal or political opinion controls whether a 
required rule is reviewed under Zauderer’s rational-basis rule or the more exacting 
compelled speech doctrine.”).  
 226. Responding to the tobacco companies’ argument that Zauderer requires 
disclosures to be “purely factual and noncontroversial,” the majority disagreed, 
claiming that any such language in Zauderer described the disclosure at issue but did 
not proscribe a general standard to trigger the rational basis analysis. See id. at 559 
n.8.  The majority went on to argue that because the phrase never appears in 
Milavetz, the Supreme never intended to proscribe a triggering standard as robust as 
“purely factual and uncontroversial,” but rather factual or accurate disclosure would 
suffice. Id. 
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courts, instead, strictly scrutinize the requirement as they would other 
forms of compelled speech.227 
Third, according to the majority, once a court determines that a 
disclosure falls within Zauderer’s ambit, rational basis review is the 
sole inquiry.228  According to the majority, Milavetz and National 
Electrical Manufacturers conclusively confirmed that Zauderer did 
not direct courts to weigh the burdens imposed by disclosure.229  As 
long as the disclosure is reasonably related to the state’s goal, any 
burdens on the speaker that disclosure imposes are irrelevant to the 
disclosure requirement’s constitutionality.230  As such, the Discount 
Tobacco City court refused to address whether the size of tobacco 
warning labels and the ratio of the package covered by them unduly 
burdened cigarette companies’ own commercial speech.231 
Once it had articulated its interpretation of Zauderer, the Discount 
Tobacco City court’s task became a two-step process.232  First, the 
court determined whether the graphic warning label provision of the 
Tobacco Control Act satisfied Zauderer’s triggering condition—that 
is, whether it required a disclosure of facts.  Second, if so, the court 
would apply rational basis review to the constitutionality of the 
warning label provision.233 
The court first distinguished the textual content of the warning 
labels from their graphic content.  It then proceeded to determine 
whether both the textual content and graphic content were properly 
 
 227. See id. at 554.  The majority cited Blagojevich for the proposition that the 
alternative to Zauderer’s analysis is strict scrutiny. See supra note 202 and 
accompanying text.  In fact, the Discount Tobacco City majority distinguished the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Blagojevich by emphasizing that the disclosures at issue 
in that case were as a matter of law nonfactual, subjective opinions.  They therefore 
triggered strict scrutiny. Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d 561.  
 228. Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 567 (“Deciding whether a disclosure 
requirement is reasonably related to the purpose is all the law requires to assess 
constitutionality.”). 
 229. See id. at 556 (“Significantly, the [Milavetz] Court upheld the required 
disclosures without separately analyzing whether they were unjustified or unduly 
burdensome.”).   
 230. The majority read the failure of the Milavetz Court to conduct an “undue 
burdens” inquiry as decisive proof that the Supreme Court never intended such an 
inquiry to be part of Zauderer’s analysis. See id. at 555–56.  
 231. See id. at 567 (“Again, to the extent that [the tobacco companies] argue that 
we must separately analyze whether the warnings are unduly burdensome, they are 
mistaken.”). 
 232. See id. at 558–61. 
 233. The majority found Zauderer’s analysis applicable. See supra note 202 and 
accompanying text. 
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factual and thus warranted rational basis review.234  The textual 
content of warning labels, the majority stated, is undisputedly factual: 
“It is beyond cavil that smoking presents health risks described in the 
warnings, and [tobacco companies] do not contend otherwise.”235  The 
court summarily concluded that the textual aspect of the warning 
labels fell within purview Zauderer’s analysis.236 
The majority more thoroughly evaluated the graphic content 
required by the warning label provision,237 but did so without 
reference to the content in any specific image published in the FDA’s 
Final Rule.238  The Tobacco Control Act’s graphic warning label 
provision would stand or fall on its own merits.  Because the Discount 
Tobacco City court would not evaluate the content of specific images, 
the court assessed, generally, whether images could convey factual 
information and, in particular, whether images could factually convey 
the negative health consequences of smoking.239  The court noted just 
how untenable a facial challenge made the tobacco companies’ 
position.240  Essentially, to withhold rational basis review, the 
companies would need to convince the court that images categorically 
could not convey factual information, a position the court described 
as “stand[ing] at odds with reason.”241  The majority proceeded to 
enumerate its own non-exhaustive list of imagery capable of factually 
conveying the negative health consequences of smoking.242  Some 
 
 234. Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 558. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See id. at 559–61. 
 238. See id. at 558 (“The Act’s graphic-warnings provision mandates that the FDA 
‘require color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking’ to 
accompany the textual warnings on cigarette packaging and advertising.  Because 
[the tobacco companies] bring a facial challenge to the warning label requirements, 
our concern is not with the specific images the FDA chose . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 239. The court never expressly delineates these two distinct questions, at times 
addressing whether images could be factual and at other times addressing the 
possibility of finding images that could convey factual information about the negative 
health consequences of smoking. Compare id. at 560 (“Zauderer itself eviscerates the 
argument that a picture or drawing cannot be accurate or factual.”), with id. at 559 
(“Students in biology, human-anatomy, and medical-school courses look at pictures 
or drawings in textbooks . . . because these pictures convey factual information about 
medical conditions and biological systems.”). 
 240. See id. at 559. 
 241. See id.  
 242. “A nonexhaustive list of some that [sic] would include a picture or drawing of 
a nonsmoker’s and a smoker’s lungs displayed side by side; a picture of a doctor 
looking at an x-ray of either a smoker’s cancerous lungs or some other part of the 
body presenting a smoking related condition . . . .” Id. at 559. 
STRAUB_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:39 PM 
1234 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
images described in the majority’s list of potential, factual images 
were indistinguishable from images the FDA finally selected.243 
Given the majority’s reasoning, this list of potential, factual images 
alone sufficed to justify a rational basis review of graphic content of 
the warning labels as prescribed by the act.  The Discount Tobacco 
City court, nevertheless, hammered its conclusion home.  First, the 
mere fact that images are representational does not preclude their 
being factual; for instance, illustrations in medical textbooks 
pictorially depict factual information about medical conditions.244  
Moreover, textual depictions of illness and disease could be equally 
representational.245  Second, the Supreme Court recognized in 
Zauderer itself that illustrations can convey information factually and 
accurately.246  The majority cited the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Zauderer to imply that the use of images for their emotional 
resonance and their ability to attract attention is not illegitimate, nor 
does it render those images nonfactual.247  Convinced that images 
 
 243. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 244. Id. (“And yet medical students learn valuable factual information in part by 
examining pictures and images of the human body and the various illnesses that may 
befall it.  So arguing that representation of a medical condition becomes an opinion 
when people could have that medical condition in ways that deviate from the 
representation would lead to an unsupportable conclusion that textual or pictorial 
descriptions of standard medical conditions must be opinions as well.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 245. See id.  
 246. See id. at 560.  Elsewhere in Zauderer the Court addressed a restriction on the 
plaintiff attorney’s use of illustrations in his advertisements. See Zauderer v. Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647–49 (1985). 
 247. See Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 560 (accusing the dissent of adopting 
the position the Supreme Court rejected in Zauderer that illustrations pose a threat 
because they create an unacceptable risk of consumer deception, manipulation, and 
confusion).  According to the majority, Zauderer foreclosed the argument that the 
ability of pictures to grab attention and evoke emotion renders them nonfactual.  The 
Supreme Court found that the images in question, an illustration of an IUD in the 
plaintiff’s ads, “serv[ed] and important communicative function: it attract[ed] the 
attention of the audience to the advertiser’s message.” See id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 
U.S. at 647) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court also found, 
however, that the same image, the illustration of the IUD, was an accurate 
representation. See id. (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647–49).  Thus, in the Supreme 
Court’s estimation the dual benefits of images—that they attract attention and evoke 
emotion—do not thereby preclude their factuality. 
On the issue of whether images’ ability to trigger visceral reactions and spark 
controversy violated Zauderer’s framework for compelled commercial disclosures, 
the Discount Tobacco City majority expressed their disagreement with both their 
own dissent and the D.C. District Court’s opinion in the R.J. Reynolds litigation. See 
id. at 569 n.17.  This seems to be the one instance in which the Discount Tobacco City 
majority broke restraint and commented on the merits of the R.J. Reynolds litigation.  
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could be factual, the majority found that “there is no reason why a 
picture could not accurately represent a negative health consequence 
of smoking, such as a cancerous lung.”248  According to the majority, 
therefore, the graphic aspects of the Tobacco Control Act’s warning 
label provision qualified for rational basis review under Zauderer.249 
Once it had determined that the graphic content in the Tobacco 
Control Act’s warning label provision triggered Zauderer’s analysis, 
the Discount Tobacco City court proceeded to the second stage of its 
inquiry: evaluating whether the warning labels reasonably related to 
government’s goal.250  The majority stated, “The Act’s required 
textual and graphic warnings are constitutional if there is a rational 
connection between the warnings’ purpose and the means used to 
achieve that purpose.”251  Here, the government’s interest was to 
prevent consumer deception on the negative health consequences of 
smoking through use of warnings that promoted a greater 
understanding of smoking’s true health risks.252  The court—perhaps 
uncomfortable with labeling current tobacco products or advertising 
as inherently or self-evidently deceptive—stated that, “The genesis of 
the [government’s] stated purpose is self evident.  Tobacco 
manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations . . . knowingly 
and actively conspired to deceive the public about the health risks 
and addictiveness of smoking for decades.”253  As such, the Discount 
Tobacco City court found it unnecessary to find that tobacco products 
(or tobacco marketing) were self-evidently deceptive; the court, 
instead, could rely on prior case law attesting to systematic, industry-
 
Still, the majority refused to address whether FDA’s finalized graphics were 
nonfactual because they had been selected for their emotional resonance and 
persuasive ability. See id. at 560 n.9 (rebuking the dissent for addressing the visceral 
reaction created by the FDA’s finalized warning labels). 
 248. Id. at 560. 
 249. See id. at 561. 
 250. See id. (evaluating the Tobacco Control Act’s disclosure provision under the 
rational basis test).  
 251. Id.  Earlier, the majority clarified its view that Zauderer did not mandate that 
the government aim narrowly at preventing consumer deception “per se.” See id. at 
557 (recounting the fact that the government’s aim in National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n was 
not to prevent consumer deception).  Moreover, nothing in the majority’s opinion 
suggests that Zauderer imposes any limitation on the government’s use of disclosures 
for purposes beyond preventing consumer deception.  It was unnecessary, however, 
for the majority to opine expressly about which goals legitimately fall within the 
purview of Zauderer’s analysis, because, as the court characterized it, the purpose of 
the tobacco warning labels is in fact to prevent the consumer from being misled about 
the health affects of tobacco. 
 252. Id. at 561. 
 253. Id. at 562. 
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wide deceptive practices by tobacco companies in the sale and 
marketing of their products.254  This case law also established 
substantial ignorance about the dangers of smoking, particularly 
among young people.255  The Discount Tobacco City majority found 
the current black and white textual warning labels to be an 
inadequate response to this history of deception: the current warnings 
were too inconspicuous to capture consumers’ attention,256 and they 
were written at a reading level too advanced for the average tobacco 
consumer.257  It is no surprise, the court stated, that the average 
smoker failed to understand the true health consequences of smoking: 
“A warning that is not noticed, read, or understood by consumers 
does not serve its function.”258  The Tobacco Control Act’s graphic 
warning labels, the court stated, remedy these deficiencies because 
they are larger and include graphics.259  For the Discount Tobacco 
City majority, the probability that the new warning labels would be 
proven more effective than the old labels sufficed to render the new 
warning labels constitutional under Zauderer’s rational basis test.260  
Yet the court did not rest on its own common sense assessment of the 
warning labels’ efficacy, but rather on “abundant evidence 
establish[ing] that larger warnings incorporating graphics promote 
greater understanding of tobacco-related health risks and materially 
affect consumers’ decisions regarding tobacco use.”261  The court cited 
multiple studies that indicated benefits in other countries—including 
Canada, Australia, and Thailand—had been achieved by 
 
 254. See id. at 562–63 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); 
United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam)). 
 255. See id. at 564 (“[R]esearch and expert testimony demonstrate that most youth 
. . . have a very inadequate understanding of the medical consequences, physical pain, 
and emotional suffering which results from smoking and the unlikelihood of their 
being able to quit at some future time.” (quoting United States v. Phillip Morris, 449 
F. Supp. 2d 1, 579–80 (D.D.C. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 256. Id. at 563.  
 257. See id. (“The [current] warnings ‘require a college reading level’ and thus 
‘may be inappropriate for youth and Americans with poor reading abilities’ and low 
levels of education.” (quoting INST. OF MED., ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION, at C-3 (2007))). 
 258. Id. at 564. 
 259. Id. at 565. 
 260. See id. at 564 (reiterating that, pursuant to the reasoning in Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. 
Ass’n, all that Zauderer’s rational basis review requires is a likelihood that the 
disclosures affect some consumer behavior).  
 261. Id. at 565. 
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implementing similar warnings.262  As such, the majority held “[t]he 
warnings are reasonably related to the purpose Congress sought to 
achieve—namely preventing consumer deception—and are therefore 
constitutional.”263 
In the end, the Discount Tobacco City majority interpreted 
Zauderer’s analysis to impose a low constitutional hurdle for 
compelled commercial disclosures.  Several aspects of the court’s 
reasoning demonstrate this conclusion.  First, the court insisted that 
Zauderer’s analysis did not include any inquiry into the burdens 
imposed by disclosure as long as the triggering condition for 
Zauderer’s analysis was met.264  Second, the court distilled the 
triggering condition for Zauderer’s rational basis review into a 
showing of mere factuality and discarded the language from Zauderer 
that suggested commercial disclosures must be purely factual and 
noncontroversial.265  Third, the court did not require that the 
commercial speech in question, here the cigarette packages and 
advertising, be self-evidently misleading.  It sufficed that (i) there had 
been prior deceptive practice by the tobacco companies and (ii) those 
prior deceptive practices contributed to consumer ignorance.266  
Fourth, the court seemed to be the first of Zauderer’s progeny to base 
the constitutionality of a disclosure requirement in part on the fact 
that the disclosure more effectively advanced the government’s goal 
than had prior (and less burdensome) alternatives.267  Fifth, for the 
majority, Zauderer’s rational basis review could be satisfied even if 
the new warnings did not actually change consumer behavior or 
successfully combat consumer deception.268  For the majority, 
Zauderer’s analysis simply required the graphic warning labels to 
disclose information pertinent to some consumers’ decision whether 
to purchase tobacco.  Ultimately, the Discount Tobacco City 
majority’s reasoning implies a highly permissive interpretation of 
Zauderer’s analysis for compelled commercial disclosures.  As such, 
the decision falls on the far liberal end of the spectrum of how to 
interpret Zauderer. 
 
 262. See id. at 565–66. 
 263. Id. at 566. 
 264. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text. 
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a. The Discount Tobacco City Dissent 
Judge Eric L. Clay dissented solely on the issue of the graphic 
warning labels.269  For Clay, all laws implicating commercial speech 
are subject to the framework outlined in one of two cases: either 
Central Hudson or Zauderer.270  According to Clay, the decision of 
which of those two frameworks to apply rests entirely upon the 
outcome of the first step in Central Hudson’s four-step analysis, 
regardless of whether the law restricts speech or compels it.271  When 
the government restricts commercial speech that is neither misleading 
nor unlawful, a court should proceed through the remaining steps in 
Central Hudson’s analysis to determine the law’s constitutionality.272  
But when commercial speech is misleading or at least potentially 
misleading, the law’s constitutionality falls within Zauderer’s ambit.273  
Clay seems to hold the view, which other judges on the panel 
criticized,274 that Zauderer’s exception is not relegated to compelled 
commercial speech, but includes restrictions on commercial speech as 
well.275  Rather, Zauderer, for Clay, provides an alternative level of 
scrutiny for commercial speech unworthy of the protection that 
Central Hudson’s framework affords because “untruthful speech, 
commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own 
sake.”276 
 
 269. See Discount Tobacco City Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 527–30 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting).   
 270. See id. at 522 (“We review the Act’s restrictions on commercial speech, 
subject to the framework initially set forth in [Central Hudson] and [Zauderer].” 
(citations omitted)).  Clay, despite urging from the tobacco companies to apply strict 
scrutiny to all provisions of the Tobacco Control Act, declined to outpace the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on commercial speech. See id.  
 271. See id. at 522–24 (differentiating the application of Central Hudson’s and 
Zauderer’s analyses on whether the commercial speech implicated is misleading). 
 272. See id. at 522–23. 
 273. “Because the Central Hudson test does not govern commercial speech that is 
false, deceptive or misleading, if commercial speech is so categorized, we apply a 
different test to determine whether a restriction, or a disclosure requirement is 
unconstitutional.” Id. at 523. 
 274. Id. at 551–52 (Stranch, J., majority opinion). 
 275. See id. at 523.  In support of his interpretation, Clay cites Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., in which Breyer states that 
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales tactics lack even the intermediate 
protection of Central Hudson’s standard. See id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 276. Id. at 523 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976)). 
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Clay singled out the warnings’ imagery as the sole component of 
the warning labels to offend the First Amendment.277  According to 
Clay, the images were subjective and the “inherently persuasive 
character of the visual medium[] cannot be presumed neutral.”278  
Clay acknowledged that the failure of consumers to appreciate the 
negative health consequences of smoking creates “an information 
deficit . . . which may render warningless tobacco products inherently 
deceptive.”279  He similarly recognized the inadequacies of the current 
warning labels.280  The government, however, had not established that 
the color graphics—given Clay’s view of their subjectivity—were a 
reasonably tailored response to that danger.281  Clay reasoned that the 
color graphics would be subjective because the FDA chose images to 
evoke emotional and visceral responses in an attempt to illegitimately 
manipulate consumer decision-making.282 
The majority criticized three flaws in the dissent’s reasoning.  The 
first was Clay’s willingness to consider the constitutionality of the 
nine images that the FDA had selected.283  The majority also criticized 
Clay for incorrectly relying on Central Hudson’s analysis284 and 
conflating speech restrictions with compelled disclosures.285  Finally, 
the majority criticized the dissent’s assertion that Zauderer’s analysis 
cannot accommodate images that provoke a visceral response or 
incite controversy: “Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an 
 
 277. Id. at 528 (Clay, J., dissenting) (“Where I part with the majority is on what I 
consider to be the constitutional flaw in the requirement for color graphic warning 
labels.”). 
 278. Id. at 526. 
 279. Id. at 528. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See id. at 529. 
 282. See id. (“While it is permissible for the government to require a product 
manufacturer to provide truthful information, even if perhaps frightening, to the 
public in an effort to warn it of potential harms, it is less clearly permissible for the 
government to simply frighten consumers or to otherwise attempt to flagrantly 
manipulate the emotions of consumers as it seeks to do here.”).  Clay augmented his 
argument against the color graphics by asserting (1) that images cannot accurately 
convey all information about the health consequences of smoking and (2) that 
viewers will interpret the images differently. Id.  As such, Clay reasoned the color 
graphics did not “materially advance” the state’s interest to the extent that the 
majority asserted they did. See id. at 530. 
 283. See id. at 527 (expressing willingness to evaluate the graphical warning labels 
facially and as-applied). 
 284. See id. at 568 (Stranch, J., majority opinion) (criticizing the dissent for its 
reliance on Central Hudson). 
 285. Id. 
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emotional response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason, 
but that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.”286 
More than the majority, Clay recognized that Zauderer calls for 
disclosures to be purely factual and uncontroversial, and this likely is 
the primary disagreement between Clay and the majority concerning 
the interpretation of Zauderer: How should the phrase “purely 
factual and uncontroversial” be employed?  For the majority, the 
phrase triggers lenient, disclosure-friendly rational basis review.287  If 
a disclosure fails to be factual, the majority would apply strict scrutiny 
to the disclosure requirement.  By contrast, for Clay the phrase 
provides the essential standard at the core of Zauderer’s analysis.  
Any disclosure that fails to be purely factual and uncontroversial is 
thereby unconstitutional—no alternative analysis required.  
According to Clay, 
[t]hough the hurdle that Zauderer erects for the government is a 
relatively low one, it is still a hurdle that the government must 
surmount. . . .  While courts have been resistant to strike down 
disclosure requirements under Zauderer, if Zauderer does in fact 
create a line, then it is clear that some types of disclosure 
requirements must cross that line.288 
2. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA 
In the midst of the Commonwealth Brands/Discount Tobacco City 
litigation, the FDA completed its assigned task under the Tobacco 
Control Act and issued the nine finalized graphic warning labels, 
complete with specific imagery and including the “1-800-QUIT-
NOW” anti-smoking hotline.  In response, the tobacco companies 
revamped their arguments and chose a new venue to challenge the 
FDA’s promulgated warning labels as unconstitutionally compelled 
disclosures.289  The stage was set for R.J. Reynolds v. FDA. 
Arguing for summary judgment in R.J. Reynolds, the tobacco 
companies maintained that the finalized warning labels were not 
purely factual and uncontroversial.  Thus, strict scrutiny, not 
Zauderer’s framework, should govern whether the new graphic 
 
 286. Id. at 569. 
 287. See supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text. 
 288. Id. at 530 (Clay, J., dissenting).  
 289. See supra notes 13–27 and accompanying text. 
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warnings were constitutional.290  The tobacco companies gave five 
reasons why Zauderer’s framework should not apply.291  First, the 
tobacco companies argued that the new warning labels were 
persuasive, not informative.292  Second, they argued that the 
illustrations and staged photographs like those used in the graphic 
warnings could not factually or uncontroversially convey information 
because of their emotionally charged content.293  Third, the anti-
smoking hotline included in the warnings, “1-800-QUIT-NOW,” was 
not a disclosure but a directive not to smoke.294  Fourth, requiring fifty 
percent of the front and back of the cigarette packs to display the 
warning labels was unduly burdensome.295  Fifth, the warnings were 
ineffective at conveying information.296  These arguments presuppose 
a very conservative interpretation of Zauderer’s framework—one 
that (i) thoroughly assesses whether a disclosure is purely factual, (ii) 
includes an undue burden inquiry, and (iii) requires the government 
to prove the disclosure’s effectiveness. 
On November 7, 2011, the District of the District of Columbia 
granted the tobacco companies a preliminary injunction against the 
graphic warning labels,297 and on February 29, 2012, the district court 
granted summary judgment to the tobacco companies. 298  In both 
instances, the district court found Zauderer’s framework inapplicable 
and instead applied strict scrutiny to the graphic warning labels.299  
For the district court, nothing about the graphic warning labels 
suggested that they should be analyzed pursuant to Zauderer: “Put 
 
 290. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 
24–36, R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, No. 11-01482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 
10.  
 291. See id. at 31–36. 
 292. See id. at 32 (“[The] FDA effectively concedes that the warnings are not 
intended to inform, but rather, to persuade customers not to smoke.”). 
 293. See id. at 33–34 (“Such tactics are no closer to mere informational disclosures 
than any of the ‘shock and awe’ advocacy used in numerous ideological debates, such 
as when animal-rights activists display photographs of mutilated animals.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 294. Id. at 35. 
 295. Id.  
 296. Id. at 36. 
 297. R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011), vacated, 696 F.3d 
1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 298. R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 299. The district court situated Zauderer squarely within compelled speech 
jurisprudence, characterizing Zauderer’s analysis as a narrow exception of the 
presumptive unconstitutionality of compelled speech. See id. at 272 (discussing 
Zauderer and compelled speech).  
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simply the Government fails to convey any factual information 
supported by evidence about the actual health consequences of 
smoking through its use of these graphic images.”300  Subsequently, 
the FDA appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 
the tobacco companies, thus giving the D.C. Circuit its chance to 
consider the constitutionality of the warning labels.301 
The D.C. Circuit issued an opinion on August 24, 2012, affirming 
the decision of the court below.302  Regarding its task, the court stated, 
“The only question before us is whether FDA’s promulgation of the 
graphic warning labels—which incorporate the textual warnings, a 
corresponding graphic image, and the ‘1-800-QUIT-NOW’ cessation 
hotline number—violates the First Amendment.”303  Like the panel in 
Discount Tobacco City, the R.J. Reynolds court split two to one.304  
Judge Janice Rogers Brown, joined by Judge A. Raymond Randolph, 
applied Central Hudson’s four-step analysis to find the warning labels 
unconstitutional infringements upon commercial speech. 
To summarize the significance of the issue before it, the court 
stated, 
[t]his case raises novel questions about the scope of the 
government’s authority to force the manufacturer of a product to go 
beyond making purely factual and accurate commercial disclosures 
and undermine its own economic interest—in this case, by making 
“every single pack of cigarettes in the country [a] mini billboard” for 
the government’s anti-smoking message.305 
Unlike the other courts that considered the graphic warning labels, 
the R.J. Reynolds majority, in addition to recognizing the elements of 
compelled speech at issue, also highlighted the elements of forced 
subsidization.306  Both created a presumption in favor of strict 
scrutiny.307  Nonetheless, the court acknowledged two “narrow and 
well-understood exceptions” to strict scrutiny—Zauderer’s analysis 
 
 300. See, e.g., id. at 272–73.  The court’s profound distaste for the labels is 
evidenced by its refusal even to call the labels “warnings” and making a point to refer 
to them only as “images” because the court viewed the labels as emotionally charged 
propaganda. Id. at 268 n.1. 
 301. See supra notes 297–300 and accompanying text. 
 302. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (2012). 
 303. Id. at 1211. 
 304. Id. at 1208. 
 305. Id. at 1212 (alteration in original). 
 306. See id at 1211.  The court ultimately made little use of the line of cases dealing 
with compelled subsidization.   
 307. Id.  
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for compelled commercial disclosures and Central Hudson’s analysis 
for commercial restrictions more generally.308  The R.J. Reynolds 
court’s first task was to determine if either of these lower levels of 
scrutiny applied.309 
The court described Zauderer’s analysis as “akin to rational basis 
review” and significantly less stringent than Central Hudson’s 
analysis.310  Nonetheless, the R.J. Reynolds court tightly cabined the 
ambit of Zauderer’s analysis.  First, the court insisted that as an 
exception to strict scrutiny, Zauderer’s framework only applies to 
disclosures aimed at preventing consumer deception.311  Moreover, 
the court read Ibanez and Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Milavetz 
to establish that before applying Zauderer, the government must 
show either that an advertisement is self-evidently deceptive or that it 
presents some “potentially real” danger of consumer deception.312  
Second, the court, like the Discount Tobacco City dissent, understood 
Zauderer’s analysis to entail a demanding inquiry into whether the 
disclosure is purely factual and uncontroversial.313  Finally, the court 
seemed to posit that Zauderer’s analysis includes an inquiry into 
whether a disclosure is unduly burdensome.314  Thus, the R.J. 
Reynolds court presented a version of Zauderer on par with the most 
conservative interpretations. 
After laying out Zauderer’s framework, the D.C. Circuit concluded 
that Zauderer’s exception was inapplicable to the graphic warning 
labels for two reasons.315  First, the court determined that the FDA 
 
 308. Id. at 1212. 
 309. See id. at 1213–17 (determining the applicability of Zauderer or Central 
Hudson analyses). 
 310. Id. at 1212.  
 311. See id. at 1213.  
 312. See id. at 1213–14 (discussing Ibanez and Milavetz and relying on Thomas’ 
concurrence in Milavetz for support).  “Zauderer, Ibanez, and Milavetz thus establish 
that a disclosure requirement is only appropriate if the government shows that, 
absent a warning, there is self-evident—or at least ‘potentially real’—danger that an 
advertisement will mislead consumers.” Id. at 1214. 
 313. See, e.g., id. at 1216 (“The disclosures approved in Zauderer and Milavetz 
were clear statements that were both indisputably accurate and not subject to 
misinterpretation by consumers.” (emphasis added)).  The extent to which the court 
proved willing to scrutinize the factuality of disclosure is best evidenced by the 
reasons it gives for finding that the graphic warning labels did not constitute purely 
factual and uncontroversial disclosures. See supra notes 303–09 and accompanying 
text. 
 314. See id. at 1212 (“[D]isclosures are permissible . . . provided the requirements 
are not ‘unjustified or unduly burdensome.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))). 
 315. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (2012). 
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had failed to prove that the purpose of the warning labels was to 
prevent consumer deception.316  Second, the court found that the 
warning labels did not fulfill Zauderer’s “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” requirement.317 
Because it could not find any danger of consumer deception that 
the graphic warning labels specifically addressed, the court concluded 
that the graphic warning labels were outside the purview of 
Zauderer’s framework.318  The court’s reasoning was twofold.  First, 
any potential for deception that the advertising practices of tobacco 
companies posed already had been adequately addressed.  
Restrictions in the Tobacco Control Act, like those prohibiting the 
use of terms like “low tar” and “light” alleviated concerns about the 
companies’ history of misleading advertising.319  Second, the 
government failed to prove that tobacco packaging itself was 
misleading.320  The court stated that neither it nor the tobacco 
companies denied the need for some disclosure,321 but that “none of 
the proposed warnings purport to address the information gaps 
identified by the government.”322 
The R.J. Reynolds court gave a litany of reasons for finding that 
the graphic warning labels were not purely factual and 
uncontroversial reminiscent of those given by the district court and 
the dissent in Discount Tobacco City.323  First, the R.J. Reynolds 
majority claimed that the symbolic, non-literal nature of the images 
rendered them nonfactual.324  Moreover, because they were symbolic, 
consumers could potentially misinterpret them.325  The court also held 
that because the FDA selected the images primarily to elicit an 
emotional response, the warnings could not be purely factual.326  
Finally, the court found aspects of the warning labels did not convey 
 
 316. Id. at 1214–16. 
 317. Id. at 1216–17. 
 318. See id. at 1217 (discussing how the new warning labels fail to prevent any 
consumer deception). 
 319. See id. at 1215–16 (“While the Companies’ representations about ‘light’ or 
‘low tar’ cigarettes might have been misleading, the Act now prohibits such 
statements.” (citations omitted)).  
 320. Id. at 1215. 
 321. See id. (referring to the tobacco companies’ concession that some disclosure is 
appropriate). 
 322. Id. at 1215 n.8. 
 323. See supra notes 269–74 and accompanying text. 
 324. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216. 
 325. Id.  
 326. Id.  
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any factual information but instead were intended to evoke emotion, 
consumer embarrassment, and “browbeat consumers into quitting.”327  
These nonfactual aspects of the warning labels included an anti-
smoking hotline and specific images like the image of the woman 
crying, the child, and the man wearing an “I Quit” t-shirt.328  Of the 
images as a whole, the court stated, “While none of these images is 
patently false, they certainly do not impart pure factual, accurate, or 
uncontroversial information to consumers.”329 
Although the R.J. Reynolds majority found Zauderer’s exception 
inapplicable, the majority found that Central Hudson provided the 
appropriate standard of scrutiny because it found the warning labels 
to be a restriction on commercial speech.330  The court assumed, but 
with some reluctance, that the government had a substantial interest 
in reducing smoking rates.331  The government, however, failed to 
meet the third step of Central Hudson: it failed to show that the 
warning labels directly advanced that interest.332  Unlike the Discount 
Tobacco City majority,333 the R.J. Reynolds majority was 
underwhelmed with the success that other nations experienced by 
implementing similar warnings.334  According to the court, the studies 
documenting the effects on such warnings in Australia and Canada 
did not establish that such warnings actually and directly reduced 
smoking rates.335  Moreover, the FDA’s own analysis predicted that 
the new warnings would reduce smoking rates by merely .088%.336  
 
 327. Id. at 1216–17. 
 328. See id. (“These inflammatory images and the provocatively-named hotline 
cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey information to consumers.”). 
 329. Id. at 1217. 
 330. See id.  Unlike the D.C. District Court, the R.J. Reynolds majority refused to 
follow the Seventh Circuit’s example in Blagojevich, maintaining that its own 
precedent required it to apply the standards for commercial speech articulated in 
Central Hudson to compelled commercial disclosures. Id. (citing United States v. 
Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
 331. See id. at 1218 n.13 (“Like the district court, we are skeptical that the 
government can assert a substantial interest in discouraging consumers from 
purchasing a lawful product, even one that has been conclusively linked to adverse 
health consequences.”). 
 332. Id. at 1222 (“FDA failed to present any data—much less the substantial 
evidence required under the [Administrative Procedures Act]—showing that 
enacting their proposed graphic warning labels will accomplish the agency’s stated 
objective or reducing smoking rates.”).  
 333. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text. 
 334. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219. 
 335. Id.  
 336. Id. at 1220.   
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This evidence was hardly substantial and did not prove that the 
warning labels directly advanced the government’s goal to a material 
degree as required by Central Hudson’s analysis.337  As such, the court 
held that the FDA’s promulgated graphic warning labels violated the 
First Amendment as unconstitutional restrictions on commercial 
speech, and remanded to the FDA, presumably for promulgation of 
new warning labels.338 
a. The R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Dissent 
Writing in dissent, Judge Judith W. Rogers argued that, with one 
caveat,339 the FDA’s promulgated warning labels did not offend the 
First Amendment.  According to Rogers, of the two standards 
applicable to regulation of commercial speech, Zauderer’s framework 
should have been preferable to Central Hudson’s because the new 
warnings presented factually accurate information.340  Regardless of 
which of these two levels of scrutiny it chose, however, Rogers 
believed that the court should have upheld the FDA promulgated 
graphic warning labels.341  Rogers noted that the factual premises 
underpinning the need for new warning labels were not in dispute: 
those premises being (1) that tobacco is addicting; (2) that smoking 
contributes to or causes a vast array of severe health conditions 
including cancer, heart disease, and cerebrovascular disease; and (3) 
that the public, and adolescents in particular, underestimate risks of 
smoking.342  Rogers emphasized that it was indisputable that tobacco 
companies had historically misled consumers about the true health 
effects of smoking and the addictiveness of nicotine.343 
Rogers reconstructed a First Amendment framework that 
acknowledged the lesser protections for commercial speech but that 
 
 337. See id. at 1219. 
 338. Id. at 1222.  However, the extent to which the FDA can promulgate new 
warning labels consistent with the majority’s reasoning in R.J. Reynolds is an open 
question.  
 339. Rogers acknowledged that the 1-800-QUIT-NOW phone number violated the 
First Amendment. See id. at 1234, 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
inclusion of the anti-smoking hotline number respectively violated Zauderer’s and 
Central Hudson’s analyses). 
 340. See id. at 1223 (arguing that Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny applies, but 
asserting that the graphic warning labels satisfy Central Hudson’s four steps as well). 
 341. See id. at 1237–38 (“Because the warning label requirement . . . appears to 
survive the First Amendment challenge under either Zauderer or Central Hudson, I 
would reverse.”). 
 342. Id. at 1223–24. 
 343. Id. at 1224. 
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also stressed the “material differences” between disclosure 
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.344  She identified 
two triggering conditions necessary to garner Zauderer’s less exacting 
scrutiny.  Zauderer’s analysis applies to regulations if (1) they impose 
a disclosure requirement rather than an affirmative limitation on 
speech and (2) they are directed at potentially misleading speech.345  If 
those two conditions are met, she asserted, Zauderer only requires 
that the disclosures reasonably relate to the government’s interest.346  
Rogers resisted expressly limiting the class of state interests 
acceptable under Zauderer’s framework to preventing consumer 
deception.347  Similarly, while she cautioned that a court should be 
mindful of unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements, 
this inquiry did not seem central to Zauderer’s analysis for her.348 
Rogers argued that the likelihood of consumer deception was so 
great for tobacco products that it did not matter that its packaging 
and advertising did not contain any affirmative misstatement.349  
“Common sense, experience, and substantial scientific evidence” 
show that even with the existing warning labels, consumers continue 
to misunderstand the implicit risks of tobacco use.350  Rogers noted 
that the circuit had recognized that an attempt to capitalize on prior 
instances of deception without disabusing consumers of any resulting 
misperceptions is itself deceptive.351  The likelihood of consumer 
deception was hardly speculative.352  Thus, the graphic warning labels 
satisfied the first of Zauderer’s preconditions for less exacting 
scrutiny.353 
 
 344. See id. at 1226 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650).  
 345. See id. at 1227 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339).  
 346. See id. at 1233 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).  
 347. Id. at 1227 n.6 (“[T]he Supreme Court appears simply to have held that a 
government interest in protecting consumers from deception is sufficient to support a 
disclosure requirement—not that this particular interest is necessary to support such 
a requirement.). 
 348. See id. at 1233 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).  Rogers ultimately 
concluded that the size and placement of the warning labels were reasonably related 
to the government’s goals but did not expressly couch her analysis terms of undue 
burdens.  
 349. Id. at 1228 (“Even absent any affirmatively misleading statements, cigarette 
packages and other advertisements that fail to display the final costs of smoking in a 
prominent manner are at least as misleading as the airline advertisements in Spirit 
Airlines [obscure the true cost of tickets].” (citations omitted)). 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. (citing Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 572 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
 352. Id. at 1229. 
 353. Id. 
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The warning labels similarly satisfied the second precondition for 
Zauderer’s lenient scrutiny; they required disclosure without 
imposing an affirmative limitation on speech.354  Implicit in Rogers’ 
argument are the ideas (1) that the phrase “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” defines what qualifies as a disclosure and (2) to 
compel anything other than purely factual and uncontroversial 
information would qualify as an affirmative limitation on speech.  For 
Rogers, the graphic warning labels met this definition because they 
were factual, accurate, and uncontroversial. 
Rogers thoroughly defended the factual nature of the graphic 
warning labels.  The majority erred, Rogers believed, in isolating the 
graphic content of the warning labels from their textual content.  
When viewed in connection with its respective textual warning, each 
image conveyed the textual warning more effectively without 
rendering the warning label inaccurate or nonfactual.355  This was true 
even of specific images—like the image of the man wearing an “I 
QUIT” t-shirt—that the tobacco companies singled out as either 
nonfactual or inaccurate.356  As the Discount Tobacco City court had 
done before her,357 Rogers emphasized that the Zauderer Court had 
lauded illustrations for their ability to attract attention and to convey 
information directly.358  Images retain the ability to effectively and 
efficiently convey information regardless of whether they are 
“digitally enhanced, illustrated, or symbolic,” but that quality does 
not render them nonfactual.359  Rogers further denied that the images 
were nonfactual or inaccurate because (1) they created a visceral 
reaction in consumers360 or (2) they could dissuade consumers from 
 
 354. See id. at 1229–32 (discussing how the graphic warning labels qualify as purely 
factual disclosure under Zauderer). 
 355. See id. at 1231 (stating that the images must be assessed in connection with 
the textual warning). 
 356. The five images to which the tobacco companies specifically objected were: 
(1) the autopsied torso, (2) the man smoking from his tracheotomy hole, (3) the man 
in the “I QUIT” t-shirt, (4) the crying baby enveloped in smoke, and (5) the crying 
woman. Id. at 1231.  Rogers elaborated on how each functioned to express the 
warnings’ overall factual message. Id. at 1231–32. 
 357. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 358. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)). 
 359. Id. at 1230. 
 360. Id. (“That such images are not invariably comforting to look at does not 
necessarily make them inaccurate.”). 
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smoking by evoking negative emotional reactions.361  According to 
Rogers, “Factually accurate, emotive, and persuasive are not 
mutually exclusive descriptions; the emotive quality of the selected 
images does not necessarily undermine the warnings’ factual 
accuracy.”362 
Unconvinced by arguments that the graphic warnings were neither 
factual nor accurate, Rogers stated that graphic warnings had met 
both preconditions and, thus, triggered Zauderer’s less exacting 
scrutiny.363  It then remained only to prove that the warning labels 
were reasonably related to the government’s interest in effectively 
communicating the negative health consequences of smoking.364  To 
do so, Rogers summarily asserted that the graphic warning labels, 
their size, and their placement were reasonably related to the 
government’s interest.365  She concluded that the warning label 
requirement appeared constitutional under Zauderer.366 
Judge Rogers assessed the graphic warning labels under Central 
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny as well.367  Under Central Hudson, she 
found that the new warning labels directly advanced the 
government’s substantial interest in reducing smoking rates and 
effectively conveying the risks of smoking, and that they were no 
more extensive than necessary.368  Thus, under either Central 
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny or Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny, 
Rogers would have found that the warning labels did not violate the 
First Amendment.369 
 
 361. See id. (“[T]he FDA’s reliance on [emotional] salience measures [in selecting 
the warning labels] was in the service of—not inconsistent with—the warnings’ 
informational purpose.”). 
 362. Id.  Rogers stopped just shy of claiming that there was no legally relevant 
distinction between fact and emotion. See id. at 1231 (“Unsurprisingly, the tobacco 
companies point neither to any case law in support of this argument nor to any legally 
significant distinction between fact and emotion.”). 
 363. See id. at 1233 (reconstructing Zauderer’s framework for compelled 
disclosures directed at misleading commercial speech). 
 364. See id. at 1233. 
 365. In support of this conclusion, Rogers cited—without discussion—common 
sense and the evidence that the FDA provided as justification for new graphics when 
it first proposed them and then published the Final Rule. See id. (citing Proposed 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,531–32; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,637). 
 366. Id. at 1233 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
 367. Id. at 1234–37. 
 368. Id.  
 369. See id. at 1223 (stating that the warning labels should survive under both 
Zauderer and Central Hudson).  
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Judge Rogers did not categorically endorse the new warning labels.  
By including the anti-smoking hotline, she believed the FDA had 
gone too far.370  She found that Zauderer was inapt for assessing the 
constitutionality of the antismoking hotline because it did not qualify 
as a factual disclosure.371  Unlike the labels’ images, for which Rogers 
insisted upon a holistic assessment to determine the warning labels’ 
factuality under Zauderer,372 Rogers suggested the “1-800-QUIT-
NOW” hotline number could be severed and assessed 
independently.373  The hotline ultimately failed the final step of 
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny; the government had not 
proven that less burdensome alternatives were inadequate.374  
Presumably, such less intrusive alternatives would not mandate that 
cigarette packages “prominently” bear an imperative “directing 
consumers to ‘QUIT NOW.’”375 
Despite the great pains the Discount Tobacco City majority took to 
preempt any inconsistency between its decision and the then-
forthcoming decision in R.J. Reynolds,376 the two decisions cannot be 
reconciled readily based on the fact that the Sixth Circuit denied a 
facial challenge to the provision of the Tobacco Control Act 
mandating the new warning labels while the D.C. Circuit ruled that 
the specific warning labels promulgated by the FDA were 
unconstitutional.  The two decisions are fundamentally at odds on a 
number of key points essential in determining the limits of compelled 
commercial disclosures under the First Amendment.  First, the two 
decisions disagree on the application and ambit of Zauderer’s lenient 
 
 370. Id. at 1223 (stating that the graphic warning labels appear to be constitutional 
except for the inclusion of the “1-800-QUIT-NOW” number). 
 371. Id. at 1234.  
 372. See supra notes 355–56 and accompanying text. 
 373. Rogers’s argument for this seems to be twofold.  First, Rogers noted the FDA 
included the hotline number on the new warning labels pursuant to separate 
statutory authority from than the statutory authority mandating the warning labels 
themselves. See id. at 1234.  Second, nothing indicated the FDA would not have 
promulgated a version of warning labels lacking the antismoking hotline. Id. at 1237 
n.12. 
 374. Id. at 1236.  
 375. See id.  Rogers does not make clear what less burdensome alternatives to the 
inclusion of the antismoking hotline the FDA might have implemented, but her tone 
suggests that the prominence and the imperative nature of the label was unnecessary 
to fulfill the statutory mandate on which the inclusion of the phone number was 
based.  
 376. See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 
568–69 (6th Cir. 2012) (criticizing the dissent for conflating its analysis of the 
provision with an as-applied challenge of the nine images). 
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scrutiny.  Second, the two decisions contain inconsistent arguments 
concerning the ability of images to convey factual, accurate, and 
uncontroversial information.  The remainder of this Note attempts to 
provide an interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Zauderer that respects the Court’s reasoning, and more importantly 
the First Amendment principles it espoused.  In doing so, this Note 
will evaluate certain aspects the Sixth Circuit’s and D.C. Circuit’s 
assessment of the new graphic warning labels in the context of that 
understanding of Zauderer’s application and ambit. 
III.  STRIKE A MATCH: ILLUMINATING ZAUDERER 
Zauderer should be interpreted to establish a three-step analysis 
for determining if a disclosure violates the First Amendment.  First, a 
court should determine whether the disclosure is limited to purely 
commercial speech.  If not, the disclosure should be subject to strict 
scrutiny.377  Second, the content of the disclosed information must be 
purely factual and uncontroversial.  Purely factual and 
uncontroversial content may be conveyed through any appropriate 
mode including text or illustrations, may be selective and 
underinclusive, and need not be emotionally sterile.  A disclosure, 
however, cannot expressly advocate a position through nonfactual 
directives or include value judgments.  Third, the disclosure must 
reasonably relate to preventing consumer deception or confusion, but 
this reasonable relationship need not be the government’s primary or 
exclusive aim.  This entails any government purpose meant to 
increase the consumers’ access to purely factual and uncontroversial 
information as long as there is a showing that the potential for 
confusion is not purely speculative.   
Put succinctly: 
Step One:  Does the disclosure regulate purely commercial speech?  
If not, strict scrutiny applies. 
Step Two:  Is the disclosure purely factual and uncontroversial?  If 
not, Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny applies.378 
Step Three:  Is the disclosure reasonably related to preventing 
potential consumer confusion or deception? 
 
 377. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 378. Arguing that Central Hudson provides the proper alternative to Zauderer is 
beyond the scope of this Note, but the facts of Pacific Gas suggests as much. See 
supra notes 78–92 and accompanying text.  
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If all three steps are satisfied, the disclosure requirement does not 
offend the First Amendment. 
But this framework is only the beginning of a unified, consistent 
understanding of Zauderer.  In the following sections, this Note 
tackles three interpretive questions already articulated: first, what 
constitutes a purely factual and uncontroversial disclosure; second, 
whether a court should apply Zauderer if the government’s purpose is 
not to prevent consumer deception; and finally, the role (if any) that 
the burdens imposed on a compelled commercial speaker by 
disclosures should play in a court’s Zauderer analysis. 
A. “Purely Factual and Uncontroversial” 
The first limitation that Zauderer imposes is that the disclosure 
must convey only purely factual and uncontroversial information.379  
The Supreme Court did not explain, however, how the phrase “purely 
factual and uncontroversial” fits within Zauderer’s framework for 
compelled disclosures.380  Since Zauderer, courts and judges have 
disagreed about the role that the phrase plays in Zauderer’s 
framework.381  Nevertheless, what has yet to be made explicit is that 
the phrase served dual roles in the Court’s analysis.  Courts often 
conflate these two roles when they interpret Zauderer.382  The first 
role is a limit on the content of disclosure requirements.  In this role, 
the phrase is definitional.  But, by limiting their content, the phrase 
also precludes disclosures from illegitimately becoming advocacy, 
and, thus, justifies lowered scrutiny when the government’s aim is 
proper.  This is its second role.  In fact, the phrase provides the 
staunchest safeguard against abusive disclosure requirements. 
 
 379. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1985). 
 380. The Zauderer Court did not refer to the factual or uncontroversial aspects of 
disclosure when it stated “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as 
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.” Id. 
 381. The disagreement within the panel in Discount Tobacco City provides a 
perfect illustration.  The majority interpreted Zauderer to require that disclosures 
simply be factual or accurate, while the dissent insisted that Zauderer proscribed the 
stricter standard that disclosures be purely factual and uncontroversial. 
 382. See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Required disclosure of accurate factual information presents little risk that the 
state is forcing speakers to adopt disagreeable state-sanctioned positions, suppressing 
dissent, confounding the speaker’s attempts to participate in self governance, or 
interference with an individual’s right to define and express his or her own 
personality.”). 
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1. The Factual Component 
Both the definitional and the justificatory aspects of the phase are 
illuminated when the Court contrasts compelled disclosure of “purely 
factual and uncontroversial” information with compelled speech that 
“prescribe[s] what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, 
or other matters of opinion.”383  In doing so, the Court implicitly 
defined disclosure as the presentation of “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” information about a commercial product.  Call this 
the factual component of the standard.  The factual component 
addresses how disclosures differ from other forms of compelled 
speech.  That is to say, the factual component of the phrase limits the 
content of disclosures.  By contrast, the forced presentation of 
orthodox political, religious, or other opinions is not a disclosure; it is 
advocacy. 
It is not a simple matter to articulate precisely what content 
satisfies the factual component.  The Court did not elaborate in 
Zauderer or Milavetz.384  Nevertheless, circuits have employed an 
intuitive notion of what content is acceptably deemed factual and 
used this notion to disqualify some apparent disclosures that were not 
appropriately factual.385  At a minimum, the intuitive notion of factual 
content for disclosures includes three broad categories.  The first 
category includes information about a product’s (or service’s) 
origin—for example, its composition, its manufacturing process, a 
specialist’s educational credentials, etc.  The second category includes 
information about legally accepted classifications pertinent to the 
product or service.386  The third category covers information about the 
consequences of a product or its use, including the product’s true 
cost387 or the health consequences associated with the product.388  For 
cigarettes, these include heart disease, lung cancer, or even, perhaps, 
 
 383. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 384. The only language that Milavetz offered that might potentially elaborate on 
the factual component is the term “accurate,” which the court seemingly uses 
synonymously with “factual.” See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 
559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010).  
 385. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966–67 
(9th Cir. 2009); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
 386. The disclosure at issue in Milavetz falls within this category. See 559 U.S. 229. 
 387. See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc., v. USDOT, 687 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(upholding requirement that airlines conspicuously disclose total cost of airfare).  
 388. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 
2009) (required disclosure of calorie count on menus). 
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bad breath.  Because warning labels alert consumers to non-apparent 
consequences, they fit within this category. 
A number of arguments proffered against the new warning labels 
misunderstand how the factual component limits the content of 
disclosures.389  First, both the D.C. District Court and the Discount 
Tobacco City dissent, to varying degrees, asserted that illustrations 
and staged photographs could never be factual.390  An illustration (the 
D.C. District Court preferred the term “cartoon”) is neither 
categorically factual nor nonfactual.  Illustrations, words, 
photographs, symbols, and hieroglyphs account for the mode of 
disclosure.  Zauderer did not suggest that some modes of disclosure 
are acceptable while others are not.  The Tobacco Control Act 
directed the FDA to promulgate factual imagery because textual 
warnings had proven ineffective.391  The fact that imagery differs from 
text as a mode of expression does not undermine its capacity to 
convey factual information.392  As long as the content is factual, 
Zauderer does not restrict a disclosure’s mode of expression. 
Similarly, representational content does not offend Zauderer’s 
factual component.  The R.J. Reynolds majority criticized the FDA 
for incorporating images designed to “symbolize” the textual 
content,393 and the court below cited the fact that the warning labels 
 
 389. See supra note 24–27 and accompanying text (enumerating the tobacco 
companies’ arguments that the new graphic warning labels violated the First 
Amendment). 
 390. See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 526 
(6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J. dissenting) (arguing that “graphic, full-color images because 
of the inherently persuasive character of the visual medium, cannot be presumed 
neutral”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(“Indeed, the fact alone that some of the graphic images here appear to be cartoons, 
and others appear to be digitally enhanced or manipulated, would seem to 
contravene the very definition of ‘purely factual.’”).  Ironically, the Court in 
Zauderer found nothing problematic in the use of illustration as a mode for 
conveying factual information and overturned a restriction on illustrations in 
advertising. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 647–48 (1985); see also Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 560 (“Zauderer 
itself eviscerates the argument that a picture or drawing cannot be accurate and 
factual.”).  
 391. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2012). 
 392. The Discount Tobacco City majority’s discussion of this topic is highly 
illuminating and should conclusively put this argument against the graphic warning 
labels to rest. See Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 559–61 (discussing the ability of 
imagery to convey factual information pursuant to the standards articulated in 
Zauderer).  “We can envision many graphic warnings that would constitute factual 
disclosures under Zauderer.” Id. at 559. 
 393. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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incorporated staged photographs and illustrations as a reason to 
withhold Zauderer’s lenient scrutiny.394  This assessment 
misapprehends how images convey general factual information.  An 
illustrated image of a diseased lung used to convey the proposition 
that “smoking causes cancer” is no less factual than a photograph of 
an actual cancerous lung used to convey the same information.395  
Both operate representationally or symbolically.  It is no more 
convincing than arguing that a textual sentence is not factual because 
words are not the things they represent, nor is a sentence the 
proposition it symbolizes.  Such arguments are premised on a 
muddled understanding of linguistics.  If the graphic warning labels 
offend Zauderer’s factual component, it cannot be because its images 
are symbolic.  If the graphic warning labels offend Zauderer’s factual 
component, it is because their images symbolize nonfactual content.396 
A second argument that the tobacco companies advanced is that 
images that elicit emotion cannot be purely factual.  This argument, 
too, is suspect.  While the vast majority of facts are emotionally 
neutral, not every fact is without emotional appeal.  Certain facts, 
those that implicate an individual’s underlying values, will elicit 
emotion.  One could argue that the more a value is universally shared 
and deeply held, the more likely a fact implicating that value will 
elicit emotion from the listener.  Facts that implicate an individual’s 
health unsurprisingly elicit emotion.397  Whether the content of the 
warning labels elicits emotion is a separate question from whether it 
is factual.398  As such, the factual component of Zauderer, even 
 
 394. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 272 n.12 (D.D.C. 
2012). 
 395. It is worth noting that text, too, is always representational.  But no one would 
argue that text cannot represent facts.  
 396. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Contrary 
to the tobacco companies’ suggestion the use of graphic images even if digitally 
enhanced, illustrated, or symbolic, does not necessarily make the warnings 
nonfactual.” (citations omitted)).  
 397. See id. at 1231 (arguing that the tobacco companies argument would 
increasingly constrain disclosures requirements as the health consequences of 
smoking became more dire).  
 398. Recall that the distinction the Zauderer Court correctly drew for First 
Amendment purposes is between “fact” and “advocacy.”  This argument errs in 
conflating “advocacy” with “persuasion.”  If Zauderer’s factual component limited 
the content of disclosures to non-persuasive facts, then Zauderer would effectively 
render all disclosures impotent. See id. at 1230 (“[F]actually accurate, emotive, and 
persuasive are not mutually exclusive descriptions; the emotive quality of the selected 
images does not necessarily undermine the warnings’ factual accuracy.”). 
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though it restricts outright advocacy, nonetheless will permit content 
that legitimately elicits emotion. 
Insofar as the R.J. Reynolds majority objected to the images 
because the FDA selected them for their persuasive effect,399 neither 
Zauderer nor Milavetz supports the claim that selective disclosure 
undermines the factual nature of the information presented.400  The 
purpose of disclosure cannot alter the content of what is disclosed.  If 
the R.J. Reynolds court’s criticism, however, was that the disclosures 
were crafted to shock or embarrass smokers and, in turn, to 
“browbeat consumers into quitting,”401 then the court is no longer 
strictly assessing the content of the warning labels.  Rather, the 
court’s true criticism would be that the FDA’s aim violated the 
analysis prescribed in Zauderer.  This criticism raises a tough 
question: if the selective presentation of purely factual information 
can have the same persuasive effect as outright advocacy, why should 
Zauderer draw a distinction between compelled factual disclosures 
and outright advocacy?  To answer this question, it helps to 
understand the second function of the phrase “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” in the Court’s reasoning in Zauderer. 
2. The Uncontroversial Component 
By limiting disclosures to purely factual and uncontroversial 
information, the Court in Zauderer did more than simply define 
acceptable content for disclosures.  In addition to the definitional 
aspect, the phrase “purely factual and uncontroversial” entails a 
normative presumption.  This normative presumption provides the 
primary justification for leniency toward compelled disclosure of 
purely factual and uncontroversial information.  An individual is 
always justified in believing purely factual and uncontroversial 
information and can be presumed to believe such information absent 
irrationality, mistake, or deception.  The same presumption does not 
hold when the government “prescribes what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion.”402  Call this 
 
 399. See id. at 1216 (finding that the graphic warning labels cannot be purely 
factual because the FDA tacitly admits they were selected for their ability to evoke 
emotion).   
 400. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010); 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 401. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217. 
 402. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
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the “uncontroversial” component of the standard.403  Purely factual 
and uncontroversial information constitutes an epistemically benign, 
universally acceptable orthodoxy.  Pure, uncontroversial facts are not 
a matter of opinion or ideology.  An individual should not be 
assumed to be irrational, deceived, or mistaken for not holding a 
particular opinion or subscribing to a particular ideology, even if that 
opinion or ideology is widely accepted.  As far back as Wooley and 
Barnette, the Court rebuked attempts to instill opinions and beliefs, 
even popular ones like patriotism404 or state pride,405 at the expense of 
an individual’s own beliefs.  The Court, however, has not been 
concerned about infringing upon an individual’s right to self-
determination or “freedom of mind” when purely factual and 
uncontroversial information is involved because such information is 
presumed to be epistemically benign.406 
The First Amendment interests of the speaker have traditionally 
fueled the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence.407  Once the Court 
in Zauderer—by situating disclosures within commercial speech 
jurisprudence—undermined the traditional rationale for holding 
compelled speech presumptively unconstitutional in two ways.  First, 
it diminished the commercial speaker’s interests, describing them as 
“minimal.”408  This, nonetheless, cannot be the full story.  Professor 
 
 403. The division of the phrase into its dual components should not be understood 
to mean that the phrase can be cleft cleanly into a “factual” element and 
“uncontroversial” element.  The distinction is meant to provide a framework for 
discussing the two separate functions that the phrase implicitly serves in the Court’s 
reasoning.  “Uncontroversial” and “factual” equally provide limits on the content of 
disclosures, even if term “factual” seems to delineate more apparently those 
limitations.  Similarly, “factual” and “uncontroversial” equally imply the normative 
presumption justifying the Court’s lowered scrutiny, even if the term 
“uncontroversial” carries the normative connotations more clearly than does 
“factual.”  
 404. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating 
compelled participation in the Pledge of Allegiance in schools); see also supra notes 
37–49 and accompanying text. 
 405. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (finding that compelled inclusion 
of state motto on license plates violated the First Amendment); see also supra notes 
59–66 and accompanying text. 
 406. Compare Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (“But the interests at stake in this case are 
not of the same order as those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette.”), with 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633. 
 407. See Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006) 
(enumerating the possible, primarily speaker-based justifications for the First 
Amendment offense of compelled speech); see also Greene, supra note 46; Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. 
REV. 839 (2005). 
 408. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
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Laurent Sacharoff has argued that the traditional justifications 
underlying compelled speech jurisprudence disproportionately focus 
on the speaker’s interests.409  The real concern in compelled speech, 
Sacharoff argues, is that it can “unfairly distort what listeners hear in 
an effort to control the minds and thoughts of those listeners.”410  
Minimizing the commercial speaker’s interest does not address the 
concern that a consumer’s interests may be infringed by a compelled 
commercial disclosure.  Second, the Court acknowledged the First 
Amendment “value[s]” consumer access to information.411  This 
assertion, however, is at odds with the legitimate First Amendment 
concern that the government should not artificially distort to what 
information consumers have access.  Why should the Court grant the 
government deference when it compels disclosures but not when it 
compels an ideological message? 
The uncontroversial component of Zauderer’s framework supplies 
the answer.  Disclosure of pure, uncontroversial facts alleviates 
concerns that the government is infringing upon listeners’ legitimate 
First Amendment interests.  The First Amendment protects an 
individual from illegitimate persuasive influences that inhibit the 
individual’s self-determination, autonomy, or freedom of mind.412  But 
purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures only expose an 
individual to information that she would otherwise believe absent 
deception, mistake, or irrationality.  Thus, the individual is not 
illegitimately persuaded.  The Court uniquely favors disclosure 
because it rectifies deception, confusion, and mistake—factors that 
themselves inhibit an individual’s freedom of mind, autonomy, and 
self-determination. 
Recall the R.J. Reynolds court’s apparent concern that selective 
disclosures seem functionally equivalent to advocacy.413  If purely 
factual and uncontroversial information can be persuasive and still 
remain entirely factual, it is because that information affects values 
already widely shared.  Hence, some factual information can evoke an 
emotional response with the sort of persuasive effect that the R.J. 
Reynolds court presumptively worried about.  Nonetheless, it does 
 
 409. See Sacharoff, supra note 49, at 335; see also Alexander, supra note 407; 
Greene, supra note 46.  
 410. Sacharoff, supra note 49, at 384. 
 411. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.  
 412. See Sacharoff, supra note 49, at 373–80.  
 413. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(calling the new warning labels unabashed attempts to evoke emotion and browbeat 
consumers into quitting). 
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not render the information nonfactual.  Nor does it infringe upon a 
person’s right to self-determination, freedom of mind, or autonomy, 
because the information is of the sort that the person is presumed to 
believe absent irrationality, mistake, or deception.  On the other 
hand, nonfactual advocacy attempts to instill opinions, values, or 
beliefs by taking advantage of the listener’s irrationality, mistake, or 
deception.  This is the line that Zauderer drew.  Disclosures limited to 
purely factual and uncontroversial information do not entail such 
illegitimate persuasion, because their persuasive force is the result of 
the factual information’s affect on the audience’s independently held, 
widely shared values.414 
B. “Reasonably Related to the State’s Interest in Preventing the 
Deception of Consumers” 
Does Zauderer’s lenient scrutiny apply when the government’s 
interest is not primarily to prevent consumer deception?  Zauderer 
and Milavetz addressed disclosure requirements expressly aimed at 
preventing consumer deception.  The R.J. Reynolds majority fixated 
on this fact to restrict Zauderer’s lenient scrutiny to disclosures 
specifically aimed at preventing consumer deception.415  This 
interpretation, however, reads Zauderer too narrowly.  The reasoning 
the Court employs in Zauderer and the First Amendment principles it 
expounds do not require courts to confine Zauderer’s ambit tightly to 
disclosures exclusively and primarily aimed at preventing consumer 
deception.  There are three reasons for this. 
First, restricting disclosures to cases of intentionally deceptive 
commercial speech does not adequately further the First Amendment 
values that the Zauderer Court invoked.  In Zauderer, the Court was 
concerned primarily with alleviating the potential that a consumer 
might be misled, not preventing deception narrowly defined.  While 
disclosures can effectively prevent deception, they can also remedy 
prior deception.  More importantly, they can prevent or remedy 
consumer confusion, as well.  The Zauderer Court recognized this 
when it referenced a string of decisions commending disclosures for 
their ability to “dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or 
 
 414. This concept also illustrates a limitation on the persuasive force of factual 
disclosures.  Independently held, widely shared values are a rarity, not the norm.  An 
individual’s concern for his or her own health and wellbeing happen to be one. 
 415. “By its own terms, Zauderer’s holding is limited to cases in which disclosure 
requirements are ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers.’” R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
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deception.”416  Instead of concentrating on whether the commercial 
speaker knowingly aimed to deceive, the Court emphasized 
consumers’ interest in avoiding inaccurate information or potentially 
drawing incorrect conclusions independent of the commercial 
speaker’s intentions.417 
Second, neither Milavetz nor Zauderer saddles the government 
with a stringent burden of proof.  In Zauderer, the Court rejected the 
lawyer’s contention that the State failed to show that his 
advertisements were actually deceptive.  Instead, the court found that 
the potential for deception was self-evident without proof by the 
State of a tendency to mislead.418  In Milavetz, the Court found that 
statements in the congressional record sufficiently established the 
potential to mislead was “hardly a speculative one.”419  To restrict 
Zauderer’s ambit to disclosures primarily aimed at directly preventing 
consumer deception is inconsistent with the deference that the Court 
has shown to the government’s purpose when analyzing disclosure 
requirements under Zauderer.420 
 
 416. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 
191, 201 (1982)) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 
(1976)).  The fact that Zauderer opinion is not a model of clarity on this issue should 
give pause to courts wishing to restrict Zauderer’s ambit to disclosures aimed at 
preventing intentionally deceptive commercial speech. 
 417. Id. at 652 (explaining how laypersons are often unaware of the technical 
meanings of terms such as “costs” and “fees” and could be expected to be misled 
because of that lack of knowledge).  It is even more difficult to maintain the position 
that the Court prescribed Zauderer’s analysis strictly to disclosures aimed at 
preventing deception when considering the disclosures upheld in Milavetz.  The 
provisions at issue in Milavetz required advertisements to disclose legal information 
about the Bankruptcy Abuse Act. See supra note 166–174 and accompanying text.  
The decision never indicated that the plaintiff law firm had an interest in deceiving its 
clients about the Act or the firm’s services.  Although the Court described the 
disclosures at issues as “directed at misleading commercial speech,” only in the 
loosest sense can this be accurate—that is, consumers could potentially draw 
incorrect inferences if the advertisements lacked the disclosed factual information. 
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250–51 (2010). 
 418. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652. 
 419. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 251 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652). 
 420. Compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–15 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (disclosures must address specific claims of deception before Zauderer 
applies, ignoring government findings on consumer misapprehension of tobacco 
risks), with Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652–53 (holding that where deception is self-
evident the state need not conduct a public survey to prove consumer 
misapprehension). 
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Finally, tightly confining Zauderer’s ambit to disclosures directly or 
primarily aimed at preventing consumer deception ignores 
Zauderer’s position in the broader First Amendment framework.  It 
conflates Zauderer’s lenient “reasonably related” analysis with the 
more stringent third step in Central Hudson, which mandates that the 
regulation directly advance the state’s interest.421  The Court did not 
incorporate such an inquiry in its analysis in Zauderer.  Nor did the 
Zauderer Court suggest that preventing deception must be the State’s 
exclusive goal.  Rather, the phrase “reasonably related” suggests a 
liberal understanding of which state interests Zauderer’s analysis 
condones.  The proper inquiry is whether there is a rational 
connection between the disclosure requirement and preventing 
deception or confusion, regardless of the State’s primary purpose for 
disclosure.422 
This understanding of Zauderer’s ambit best accounts for the 
ubiquitous role that commercial disclosures play in modern 
regulatory schemes.  Consider, for example, the FDA’s nutritional 
labels.  The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) requires 
all products classified as “food” to bear nutritional labels identifying a 
product’s ingredients and nutritional contents.423  Pursuant to the 
FDCA, the FDA has promulgated rules specifying the format and 
package location for the warning labels.424  Products not labeled in 
compliance with the FDCA, either because the package conveys 
misleading statements or because the product fails to bear the correct 
nutritional label, are “misbranded.”425  Under a narrow interpretation 
of “aimed at preventing deception,” the FDA would not be able to 
compel nutritional labels on products unless the product was 
intentionally misbranded with a misleading statement.  A narrow 
interpretation would subject the most innocuous compelled 
commercial disclosures, nutritional labels, to a much more stringent 
First Amendment scrutiny.  This result is not consistent with the 
principle that “the First Amendment protection to commercial speech 
 
 421. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
 422. The Discount Tobacco City majority takes an even more lax interpretation. 
See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 556 (6th Cir. 
2012) (“[Z]auderer’s framework can apply even if the required disclosure’s purpose is 
something other than or in addition to preventing consumer deception.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 423. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2012); see generally, Krista Hessler Carver, A Global 
View of the First Amendment Constraints on FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151 
(2008). 
 424. 21 C.F.R § 101.1 (2013). 
 425. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2012). 
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is justified principally by the value to the consumers of information 
such speech provides.”426 
Therefore, the Court’s phrase “preventing consumer deception” 
should be unpacked, made explicit, and made consistent with the 
Court’s own reasoning so that it is broad enough to include 
government purposes reasonably related to preventing potential 
confusion or deception of consumers.427  This interpretation places the 
emphasis equally on the commercial speech’s effect on the consumer 
and the intent of the commercial speaker.  It alleviates the burden 
that a strict interpretation of “preventing deception” would place on 
the government to prove actual deception, a burden the Court has not 
placed on the government.  Finally, it gives courts sufficient latitude 
to invalidate disclosures when the government’s purpose is 
disingenuously or too tenuously related to preventing confusion or 
deception.428 
C. “Unjustified or Unduly Burdensome Disclosure 
Requirements” 
Finally, courts should not mistakenly assess the burden imposed by 
purely factual and uncontroversial commercial disclosures.  Once 
triggered, Zauderer’s sole inquiry is whether the disclosure 
reasonably relates to the aim of preventing consumer confusion or 
deception.  The Zauderer Court expressly stated that it would not 
subject disclosures to a least restrictive means assessment.429  Several 
courts have failed to appreciate this when applying Zauderer’s 
analysis.  This violates the logic of the Court’s reasoning in Zauderer 
and Milavetz: 
We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure 
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling 
 
 426. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 427. The analysis by the Second Circuit in Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n provides a 
model. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 428. It is still within a court’s power to invalidate a law when the government is 
unable “to point to any harm that is potentially real, not purely hypothetical.” Ibanez 
v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. and Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994).  The Federal 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have proven willing to give Zauderer’s analysis these teeth. 
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 643 (6th Cir. 2010) (severing a 
“contiguity” provision while upholding the rest of a disclosure requirement because 
evidence cited for the “contiguity” provision was anecdotal). 
 429. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 n.14 (“We reject appellant’s contention that we 
should subject disclosure requirements to a strict ‘least restrictive means’ analysis . . .  
[We] have recommended disclosure requirement as one of the acceptable less 
restrictive alternatives to actual suppression of speech.”). 
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protected commercial speech.  But we hold that an advertiser’s 
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements 
are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception 
of consumers.430 
Although subtle, this language indicates that it is sufficient, first, 
that the compelled speech at issue is a disclosure requirement,431 and 
second, that disclosure is reasonably related to that preventing 
consumer deception.  Thus, a statement preceding the articulation of 
Zauderer’s relaxed scrutiny—i.e. “that unjustified or unduly 
burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First 
Amendment”—is not a further step in its analysis, but is, instead, the 
general principle to which Zauderer’s relaxed scrutiny is an 
exception.  Courts that assess the burdens imposed by disclosure or 
look to other less restrictive alternatives add conditions to Zauderer’s 
analysis absent from the language of the opinion. 
As such, although a court is free to and should assess the relative 
burdens of a disclosure when applying more stringent scrutiny, 
Zauderer precludes this step.  This preclusion should not be 
worrisome, because other aspects of Zauderer’s analysis safeguard 
against unjustified burdens on commercial speech, most prominently 
the “purely factual and uncontroversial” components of the analysis.  
Alternatively, by avoiding a least restrictive means-type analysis, the 
Zauderer court has granted the government sufficient latitude to 
tailor effective disclosures.  As the Discount Tobacco City majority 
stated, “A warning that is not noticed, read, or understood by 
consumers does not serve its function.”432  An undue burden or least 
restrictive means analysis would require courts to weigh the 
effectiveness of disclosures against the burden imposed on the 
commercial speaker.  This is inconsistent with the Zauderer Court’s 
own statement that the “[commercial speaker’s] constitutionally 
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information 
in his advertising is minimal.”433  Because Zauderer’s analysis ensures 
 
 430. Id. at 651 (emphasis added); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. 
United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249–50 (2010).  Note that in Milavetz, the Court omitted 
the term “commercial” when it acknowledged that unduly burdensome disclosures 
have the potential to chill “protected speech.”  This suggests even more strongly that 
the Court is unconcerned with burdens imposed by accurate commercial disclosures. 
 431. That is to say, it compels purely factual and uncontroversial information about 
a product or service from a commercial speaker. 
 432. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 564 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 433. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
STRAUB_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:39 PM 
1264 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
that the information disclosed is purely factual and uncontroversial 
and therefore benign from a First Amendment perspective, courts can 
defer to the legislatures to craft disclosure requirements that 
effectively prevent consumer deception and confusion. 
CONCLUSION 
On October 26, 2012, the tobacco companies petitioned the 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in Discount Tobacco City, now 
under its third caption, American Snuff Co. v. United States.434  The 
Court denied certiorari on April 22, 2013.435  Meanwhile, after the 
D.C. Circuit denied the agency’s motion for a rehearing en banc,436 
the FDA opted not to seek Supreme Court review in R.J. Reynolds.437  
Instead, the FDA will retry its hand at promulgating graphic warning 
labels consistent with the Tobacco Control Act’s directive.438  For 
now, the vast edifice of compelled commercial disclosures built on 
Zauderer’s lenient scrutiny will remain relatively unaffected.  For 
now, cigarette packages will continue to bear “[the] boring, bold, 
black and white . . . statement that these neat little soldiers of death 
are, in fact, trying to kill you.”439  For now the warning on cigarette 
packages will remain a cold, unlit, and factual statement lacking 
emotionally incendiary images of diseased lungs, rotted teeth, or 
incubated infants. 
 
 434. See Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Snuff Co. v. United 
States, No. 12-521 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012). 
 435. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. LLC v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1996 
(mem.) (2013). 
 436. Brett Norman, Court Blocks FDA Warning Labels Appeal, POLITICO (Dec. 6, 
2012), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/court-blocks-fda-tobacco-warning-
labels-appeal-84656.html. 
 437. Steve Almasy, FDA Change Course on Graphic Warning Labels for 
Cigarettes, CNN (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/health/fda-graphic-
tobacco-warnings. 
 438. Id. 
 439. ROCKNROLLA (Warner Bros. 2008). 
